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ARTICLES
TALES FROM A FORM BOOK: STOCK STORIES AND
TRANSACTIONAL DOCUMENTS*
Susan M. Chesler** & Karen J. Sneddon***
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal transactions are stories. They are the stories of marriages, busi-
ness partnerships, acquisitions, births, and deaths. These stories are built
around the hopes, fears, wishes, and concerns of the particular parties to the
transaction. But at their core, these stories are not just about the individual
circumstances of those parties. At the core of each of these individual sto-
ries is a stock story. Virtually every transactional document starts with a
form. And stock stories are embedded within each form document. The
forms feature inge´nues, tricksters, misers, and sages who undertake jour-
neys, confront mutinies, and at times achieve glory.
This article examines the tales of transactions by examining the stock
stories within transactional document forms. This article will first define the
term “stock story,” highlighting the applicability of the term “stock story”
to the law and its primary focus to date on litigation-based legal documents.
* Portions of this article were presented at the Wills, Trusts, and Estates Meets Gender, Race &
Class II Conference hosted by Oklahoma City University School of Law on September 10, 2016.
Portions of this article were also presented at the Sixth Biennial Conference on Applied Legal
Storytelling on July 12, 2017. Thanks to the conference attendees for their thoughts, comments, and
reactions. Also, thanks to Professor Linda Edwards and Professor Judy Stinson for their comments on
drafts of this article.
** Clinical Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. I
would like to thank the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law for its generous support of this article. I’d
also like to thank my research assistant, Nicolas Martino.
*** Professor of Law, Mercer Law School. My thanks are extended to Mercer Law School for its
support of this article.
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This article will then identify and analyze the stock stories embedded within
a variety of transactional form documents, such as wills, trust agreements,
employment contracts, premarital agreements, and advance directives. Spe-
cifically, the article will analyze the (a) stock characters, (b) stock plots,
(c) stock situations, and (d) stock inevitable outcomes of transactional form
agreements. This article will then address the possibilities and pitfalls re-
lated to recognition of the stock stories embedded within these transactional
forms.
With the use of stock stories by lawyers in any situation, there is a
concern about misrepresenting the unique nature of the individual transac-
tion, as well as the potential for overreliance on the stock story, which may
ultimately lead to hindering drafting innovation. Yet to the contrary, the
recognition of stock stories in transactional form documents may also allow
for effective narrative shortcuts, providing valuable guidance to the forma-
tion of the transaction as well as enabling a better understanding of the
transaction by the parties, drafters, and courts. Rather than undercut or ne-
gate the value of utilizing transactional form documents and transactional
form books, this article seeks to use the understanding of transactional form
documents as stock stories to better appreciate how to most effectively use
such forms in practice.
II. STOCK STORIES AND THE LAW
A. Stock Stories Defined
Stock stories are story types. Stock stories are conventional stories that
rely upon stock characters, stock situations, stock plots, and stock outcomes
to evoke a stock response.1 Stock stories are generic stories conveyed in
broad brushstrokes that are readily understood by audiences. They are cul-
turally specific and represent the conventions of the particular genre in
which the story arises.2 Thus, stock stories are not particular stories about
individuals but rather are stylized stories that become templates for the sub-
sequent creation of particular stories.3 Once a stock story has been triggered
in the mind of the audience, that individual’s perception of the events and
1. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 45–47, 117–18, 121–22
(2000).
2. For instance, the commedia dell’arte is built upon a variety of stock stories. E.g., PAUL KURITZ,
THE MAKING OF THEATER HISTORY 170 (1988) (describing the commedia dell’art as an acting troupe
using stock characters and stock situations to improvise the performance). Fairy tales and pantomimes
also rely upon stock stories. JENNIFER SCHACKER, FOLKTALES AND FAIRY TALES: TRADITIONS AND
TEXTS FROM AROUND THE WORLD 759 (Anne E. Duggan, Donald Haase & Helen Callow eds., 2d ed.
2016).
3. See, e.g., Linda H. Edwards, Speaking of Stories and Law, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 157,
171 (2016) [hereinafter Edwards, Speaking of Stories].
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circumstances will be based, at least in part, on the stock situations embed-
ded in that story and the perceived inevitable stock outcome.4 Stock stories
thus serve as patterns and models for the crafting of individual stories. In-
deed, the ubiquitous nature of stock stories is found in copyright law. Stock
stories, including standard plot devices and standard character types, are not
protectable by copyright.5
B. Stock Stories and the Rules of Law
The law itself may be conceptualized as a story.6 The law represents
society’s ideals and attempts to resolve problems based on cultural, eco-
nomic, and historical experiences. Those problems are both actual disputes
and potential disputes. Stories, also referred to as narratives, play a role in
shaping the law.7 Courts, for example, may rely upon narratives to interpret
laws.8 Indeed, the concept of stare decisis involves reducing individual
cases to patterns and matching those patterns to existing cases.9 By reduc-
ing individual cases to repeating patterns, the law compresses individual
narratives into stock stories. In other words, the core narrative of the law is
a stock story.
Most of the scholarly attention about stock stories and the law has
been focused on litigation practice and, specifically, on the use of story-
4. Jennifer Sheppard, What if the Big Bad Wolf in All Those Fairy Tales Was Just Misunder-
stood?: Techniques for Maintaining Narrative Rationality While Altering Stock Stories That Are Harm-
ful to Your Client’s Case, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 187, 192–93 (2012).
5. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 106 (2012); Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815,
824 (9th Cir. 2002); Lewinson v. Henry Holt & Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 547, 567 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
6. Stephen Paskey, The Law Is Made of Stories, 11 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 51, 52 (2014)
(declaring that the “rule by which a decisionmaker can grant a remedy, impose a punishment, or confer
some benefit has the underlying structure of a stock story”) (emphasis in original); see also Jane B.
Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1997); Joshua A. Newberg, The
Narrative Construction of Antitrust, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 181 (2003).
7. Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Dis-
course, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7 (1996); Erin Sheley, The “Constable’s Blunder” and Other Stories: Nar-
rative Representation of the Police and the Criminal in the Development of the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 121 (2010).
8. E.g., Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making:
A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 259 (2009); Sherri Lee Keene, Victim or Thug? Examining the Relevance of Stories in
Cases Involving Shootings of Unarmed Black Males, 58 HOW. L.J. 845, 846–47 (2015); J. Christopher
Rideout, A Twice-Told Tale: Plausibility and Narrative Coherence in Judicial Storytelling, 10 LEGAL
COMM. & RHETORIC 67, 67–68 (2013); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1756–57 (1990).
9. See, e.g., LINDA ALVAREZ, DISCOVERING AGREEMENT: CONTRACTS THAT TURN CONFLICT INTO
CREATIVITY 8 (2016) (observing that the recognition of patterns may result in the imposition of a pattern
“regardless of whether the prescribed result is actually beneficial or wise in the fuller, deeper, particular
context of the real-life parties and circumstances”).
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telling to persuade audiences.10 It has repeatedly been shown that a variety
of audiences, including juries,11 trial judges,12 and appellate judges,13 are
more likely to be persuaded by a lawyer’s arguments or a client’s position
through the effective use of storytelling techniques.14 Lawyers can better
persuade their audiences by incorporating or countering, as the case may be,
stock stories in a wide array of written and oral communications, such as
opening and closing arguments,15 pleadings,16 and briefs.17
While much less focus has been placed on examining the use of story-
telling in the law for the purpose of developing the law, at least one author
has declared that the “rule by which a decision-maker can grant a remedy,
impose a punishment, or confer some benefit has the underlying structure of
a stock story.”18 Professor Stephen Paskey posits that “every governing le-
gal rule” contains “the essential elements of a story—events, characters,
and plot.”19 This theory applies to rules of law enacted both by statute and
developed through common law.20 Professor Linda Edwards counters that
10. E.g., J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LE-
GAL WRITING 53 (2008).
11. E.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 285 (2013); Pamela A.
Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit
Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 311 (2012); see also BOB GIBBINS & A. RUSSELL SMITH, Jury’s
Stock Stories, 4D American Law of Products Liability 3d § 72:7 (2004).
12. E.g., Amy Bitterman, In the Beginning: The Art of Crafting Preliminary Statements, 45 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1009, 1010–11 (2015); Berger, supra note 8, at 259. R
13. See Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief As Story, 14 J. LEGAL WRIT-
ING 127 (2008); Maureen Johnson, You Had Me at Hello: Examining the Impact of Powerful Introduc-
tory Emotional Hooks Set Forth in Appellate Briefs Filed in Recent Hotly Contested U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions, 49 IND. L. REV. 397 (2016); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby
Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal
Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 768–69 (2006).
14. E.g., Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias: A Cognitive Science Primer
for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 278, 280–82 (2014).
15. See Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55, 58 (1992); Philip N. Meyer, “Desperate for Love III”: Rethinking Closing
Arguments as Stories, 50 S.C. L. REV. 715, 716–17 (1999).
16. E.g., Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Prac-
tice, 15 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEG. WRITING INST. 3, 4 (2009); Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old Story:
Using Narrative Theory to Understand and Overcome the Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1, 2–3 (2014).
17. See Paskey, supra note 6, at 58. R
18. Paskey, supra note 6, at 52 (emphasis in original); see also Peter Brooks, “Inevitable Discov- R
ery” – Law, Narrative, Retrospectivity, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 71, 72 (2003); Linda H. Edwards, Once
Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 883, 883–85 (2010); Lorie M.
Graham & Stephen M. McJohn, Cognition, Law, Stories, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 255, 258 (2009);
Christine Metteer Lorillard, Stories that Make the Law Free: Literature as a Bridge Between the Law
and the Culture in Which It Must Exist, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 251, 252 (2005).
19. Paskey, supra note 6, at 52. R
20. Id. at 78.
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rules themselves are not stories.21 Instead, Professor Edwards posits that
rules of law contain stock stories. The rule of law may not itself represent a
story, but the rules have been shaped by stories relayed in prior cases or
produced by society, and both stories and rules may use similar structures.22
Whether or not public laws are stories, private laws may be conceptu-
alized as stories. Private law is generally created when individuals or enti-
ties voluntarily enter into legally enforceable agreements.23 Contracts and
estate planning documents are in essence the private law between the par-
ties that agree to be legally bound by them.24 These documents rely upon
stories: both the particular stories of the involved parties and the stock sto-
ries embedded within their structure.
C. Stock Stories and Litigation-based Legal Documents
Whether the law is recognized to be a story or not, the value of using
narrative techniques to develop legal documents has been widely recog-
nized.25 The events of a life may not be a purposive narrative that follows
“Chekov’s canon”26—meaning that a person’s life story does not only in-
clude events purposeful to the forming of a cohesive, unified narrative.
However, life is lived in a series of narrative moments. Legal documents
relay some of those narrative moments. The narrative moments, or stories,
come from the parties, the drafter, and the genre of the legal document
produced.27 As a consequence, those stories represent not only the actual,
individual stories but also stock stories that are more broadly applicable.
21. Edwards, Speaking of Stories, supra note 3, at 174. R
22. Id. at 173–74.
23. See, e.g., MARGARET TEMPLE-SMITH & DEBORAH CUPPLES, LEGAL DRAFTING: LITIGATION DOC-
UMENTS, CONTRACTS, LEGISLATION, AND WILLS 96 (2013) (defining the drafter of a contract as a
“lawmaker”).
24. E.g., Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873,
1873–74 (2011); Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180,
2181–82 (2011); Nathan B. Oman, Promise and Private Law, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935 (2012); Reid
Kress Weisbord, The Advisory Function of Law, 90 TUL. L. REV. 129, 133 (2015).
25. For a bibliography of applied legal storytelling, see J. Christopher Rideout, Applying Legal
Storytelling: A Bibliography, 12 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 247 (2015).
26. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 99, 100 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (observing that life events,
unlike a constructed narrative, include meaningless and random events). Chekhov’s canon refers to
dramatic principle that a narrative should include only characters, details, and events related to the
narrative. Irrelevant information is not included in the narrative. See, e.g., Aden Ross, Stumped, by
Debora Threedy, A Playwright’s Perspective, 81 UMKC L. REV. 833, 834 (2013).
27. For an exploration of genre and legal writing, see Katie Rose Guest Pryal, The Genre Discovery
Approach: Preparing Law Students to Write Any Legal Document, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 351 (2013); Bret
Rappaport, A Lawyer’s Hidden Persuader: Genre Bias and How It Shapes Legal Texts by Constraining
Writers’ Choices and Influencing Readers’ Perceptions, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 197 (2013); Jennifer Murphy
Romig, Legal Blogging and the Rhetorical Genre of Public Legal Writing, 12 LEGAL COMM. & RHETO-
RIC 29 (2015); Karen J. Sneddon, In the Name of God, Amen: Language in Last Wills and Testaments,
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The power of stock stories has been widely recognized in the drafting
of litigation-based documents.28 This work has been informed by cognitive
science and psychology.29 Stories may help the audience engage with the
facts of a particular case by helping them to better remember those facts and
by projecting a meaning to the facts based on a recognizable, pre-existing
stock story.30 A lawyer’s reference in a document to a recognizable stock
story enables the reader to put the client’s specific facts of the case into a
frame of reference and lends credibility, or persuasiveness, to the client’s
story.31 Scholars have explored the constraining nature of stock stories on
the litigation-based documents produced.32 Scholars also explored the po-
tential need to re-frame a narrative to counter a stock story that the audience
would interpret, perhaps incorrectly, as applicable to the presented narra-
tive.33
Just as narrative techniques may be used to craft litigation-based docu-
ments, so too may narrative techniques be used to craft transactional docu-
29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 665 (2011); Jeff Todd, Genre Theory for Product Instructions and Warnings, 54
WASHBURN L.J. 303, 304 (2015).
28. E.g., Diana Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice for Native
Americans Involved in Interparental Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5 PHOENIX L.
REV. 457, 460 (2012).
29. E.g., Lea B. Vaughn, Feeling at Home: Law, Cognitive Science, and Narrative, 43 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 999, 1007 (2012) (examining how stories facilitate learning and memory).
30. E.g., Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far, Far
Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in Appellate Briefs
and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 259–61 (2009) (examining how lawyers can use
stock stories to draft persuasive court documents).
31. See Rideout, supra note 10, at 67. R
32. See, e.g., Randy Gordon, Institutionalizing Exemplary Narratives: Stories as Models for and
Movers of Law, 25 LAW & LIT. 337, 338 (2013); Nicole Smith Futrell, Vulnerable, Not Voiceless:
Outsider Narrative in Advocacy Against Discriminatory Policing, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1604 (2015).
33. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Black Women’s Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power
of Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941, 945 (2006); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narra-
tives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
861, 866–67 (1992); Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 78 (2008); Carolyn Grose, Of Victims, Villains and Fairy
Godmothers: Regnant Tales of Predatory Lending, 2 NE. U. L.J. 97, 101–02 (2010); Lyman Johnson,
Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 847, 850; Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narra-
tives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 211–13 (2012); Katherine Lusby,
Hearing the Invisible Women of Political Rape: Using Oppositional Narrative to Tell a New War Story,
25 U. TOL. L. REV. 911, 912 (1995); Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales
of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 695, 697 (1994); Martha Merrill Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal Meaning: Spectacular Trials,
the Unwritten Law, and Narratives of Criminal Responsibility, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 393, 397 (1999);
Amy D. Ronner, The Cassandra Curse: The Stereotype of the Female Liar Resurfaces in Jones v.
Clinton, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 123 (1997).
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ments.34 The actual stories of the parties and stock stories will, therefore, be
embedded within transactional documents.
III. TRANSACTIONAL FORM DOCUMENTS AS STOCK STORIES
The use of form documents and form books by lawyers is perhaps as
old as the law itself.35 Many trace the development of legal forms and form
books to the Middle Ages.36 Although the term “form book” may seem
anachronistic in this digital age, form books are not mere relics of the past.
Form books have evolved with the practice of law and are available for a
variety of practice areas. Compilations of forms may be in hard copy or
digital copy.37 Form documents may be produced by commercial publish-
ers,38 shared as part of Continuing Legal Education materials,39 enacted as
statutory sections,40 and created through personal use. Legal research
databases include downloadable and searchable form documents for a wide
variety of practice areas, such as Asset Purchase Agreements, Employment
Agreements, Leases, Publishing Agreements, and Trust Agreements.41 For
purposes of this article, a compilation of form documents, whether commer-
cially or personally prepared, and whether in hard copy or digital form, will
be referred to as a form book.42
34. Susan M. Chesler & Karen J. Sneddon, Once Upon a Transaction: Narrative Techniques in
Drafting, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 263, 264 (2016).
35. See generally ADAM FREEDMAN, THE PARTY OF THE FIRST PART: THE CURIOUS WORLD OF
LEGALESE 25–30 (2007) (attributing the spread of the first form books to the invention of the printing
press).
36. DARSIE BOWDEN, THE MYTHOLOGY OF VOICE 28–29 (1999) (referencing medieval form
books); LISA EDE & ANDREA LUNSFORD, SINGULAR TEXTS/PLURAL AUTHORS: PERSPECTIVES ON COL-
LABORATIVE WRITING 77 (1990) (referencing JAMES J. MURPHY, RHETORIC IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1974);
JUDSON BOYCE ALLEN, THE FRIAR AS CRITIC: LITERARY ATTITUDES IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES
(1971)).
37. For insight into the transition from exclusively hard copy to electronic access, see Gerald J.
Robinson, The Birth of Forms on Disk—Confessions of a Formbook Author, 9 LAW. PC 6 (1992).
38. E.g., 5 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Prenuptial Property Agreement—Barring All Rights in
Property of Other Spouse—Reserving Property of Both for Themselves—Subject to Certain Payments to
Wife § 61.19 (2004); 2 FREDERICK K. HOOPS, FREDERICK H. HOOPS III, & DANIEL S. HOOPS, FAMILY
ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE Appendix 25 Spendthrift Trust (4th ed. 2000).
39. E.g., Philip D. Weller, Drafting 1.01 (with Real Estate Examples and Resources), 30 PRAC.
REAL EST. LAW. 21, 21 (Jan. 2014).
40. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18-A, § 2–514 (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 700.2519 (West 2016); see also UNIF. STAT. WILL ACT (1984). For an examination of statutory wills,
see Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-in Will Forms—The First Decade: Theoretical Constructs and Em-
pirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 772 (1993); Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Will Methodologies—
Incorporated Forms vs. Fill-In Forms: Rivalry or Peaceful Coexistence? 94 DICK. L. REV. 231, 234
(1990).
41. From Bloomberg DealMaker Search. A description of this service is available at DealMaker,
BLOOMBERG LAW, https://perma.cc/FLA2-SF8J (last accessed March 27, 2017).
42. A compilation for forms may also be called a form file.
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The prevalence and continued use of forms evidences the value of such
forms in the practice of law.43 Whether a solitary provision from one form
document, an amalgamation of a variety of form documents, or the whole-
sale adoption of a form, no transactional document begins with a blank
screen or a blank sheet of paper.44 Acknowledging the use of form docu-
ments does not undercut the value of the drafting attorney to the transac-
tion45 or negate the customization that tailors the form document to the
unique facts and circumstances of the parties and transaction.46 Instead,
form documents represent the starting point of most transactional drafting
and can provide valuable guidance throughout the drafting process.47
Although the use of form books is not restricted to the drafting of
transactional documents,48 most legal drafters will start with a form.49 As
one author wrote, “The repetitive nature of much of legal drafting makes
43. See Victor P. Goldberg, The “Battle of the Forms”: Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot
Rule, 76 OR. L. REV. 155, 157, 164 (1997); Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts are Written in “Legalese,” 77
CHI.–KENT L. REV. 59, 70–71 (2001) (“Using time-tested forms, and changing them as little as possible,
makes sense for many reasons, even where the forms are unwieldy and convoluted.”).
44. See Lisa L. Dahm, Practical Tips for Drafting Contracts and Avoiding Ethical Issues, 46 TEX.
J. BUS. L. 89, 96–97, 100 (2014).
45. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 486, 492–94 (2007).
46. Dahm, supra note 44, at 100 (“As a contract drafter, the successful transactional attorney will
have numerous form contracts on which he/she can rely, but will use them only with caution and only as
a starting point to create unique contracts for each client and transaction.”); Kirsten K. Davis, Legal
Forms as Rhetorical Transaction: Competency in the Context of Information and Efficiency, 79 U. MO.
KAN. CITY L. REV. 667, 677–78 (2011).
47. See Davis, supra note 46, at 682 (“For example, in the Second Edition of Forms Under Article R
9 of the UCC, written by the ABA Section of Business Law Uniform Commercial Code Committee,
forms are described as the ‘nuts and bolts’ of ‘most secured transactions,’ which suggests completeness,
and also as ‘starting point[s]’ to be adapted and revised for ‘the specifics of [a] particular secured
transaction,’ which suggests incompleteness . . . authors admonish that ‘[f]orms are intended to serve as
examples and must always be tailored to the facts and legal requirements of each situation.’”).
48. See, e.g., Kevin D. Collins, The Use of Plain-Language Principles in Texas Litigation Form-
books, 24 REV. LITIG. 429, 438–44 (2005); see also George Hathaway, Review of Michigan Causes of
Action Formbook, 76 MICH. B.J. 86 (1997).
49. One author describe the process of drafting as follows:
The process of legal drafting typically begins with an associate dragging examples out of
the firm’s form file and changing the names, dates, and description of the transaction. (Draft-
ing is perhaps the only form of writing in which plagiarism is considered a positive.) Particular
provisions are then modified to suit the singularities of the business deal. When the deal is
done, the new document is added to the form file, ready for the next associate.
HOWARD DARMSTADTER, HEREOF, THEREOF, AND EVERYWHEREOF: A CONTRARIAN GUIDE TO LEGAL
DRAFTING xi (2d ed. 2008).
In legal education, a debate about the use of forms in drafting class continues. E.g., Jacob M.
Carpenter, Unique Problems and Creative Solutions to Assessing Learning Outcomes in Transactional
Drafting Courses: Overcoming “The Form Book Problem,” 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 195 (2012); see also
William E. Foster & Emily Grant, Memorializing the Meal: An Analogical Exercise for Transactional
Drafting, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 403 (2014) (arguing that transactional drafting courses need to foster
flexibility and creativity as components of the drafting process).
8
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the use of form documents economically efficient.”50 Form documents, and
the compilation of form documents into a form book, are thus generalized
documents to cover a broad range of situations.51 Transactional form docu-
ments are recognizable by lawyers and non-lawyers alike52 and use repeat-
ing patterns.53 In other words, form books are compilations of stock stories.
Stock stories are readily recognizable, generalized patterns.
This section thus examines the characteristics of stock stories embed-
ded within transactional form documents. Specifically, this section focuses
on four key characteristics of the stock story: (a) characters, (b) plots,
(c) situations, and (d) outcomes. Various transactional form documents are
used to identify the stock story aspects embedded within form documents.54
A. Characters
Stories are populated with characters. Form documents are populated
with stock characters. A stock character may be defined as “a conventional
character that is expected to appear in certain literary forms, such as the
‘Prince Charming’ in fairy tales.”55 Stock characters are one-dimensional,
recurrent character types.56 Stock characters rely upon a single stereotypical
50. M.H. Hoeflich, Law Blanks & Form Books: A Chapter in the Early History of Document Pro-
duction, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 189, 191 (2008).
51. In addressing the “conventional dispositive patterns of wills,” Professor Jane Baron wrote:
Even if a testator chooses not to conform to conventional dispositive patterns, those pat-
terns may nonetheless exert an influence on the terms of his [or her] will. The testator is likely
to be aware that the world of others for whom he writes is also familiar with the conventional
patterns of wills and that, based on these patterns, those others may have expectations about
what the will is likely to or should say. The testator may write to meet those expectations or to
explain why those expectations are being defeated.
Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 652 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
52. E.g., Baron, supra note 51, at 657–58 (“The perception of wills as a story-type or stock story R
helps explain why and how individuals unsophisticated about law ‘know’ what a will is and what it
does.”).
53. E.g., WAYNE M. GAZUR & ROBERT M. PHILLIPS, CASE STUDIES IN ESTATE PLANNING WITH
ABRIDGED STUDENT FORMS 72 (2004) (describing the form documents of wills and trusts as “recurring
patterns”).
54. The purpose of this article is to focus on the stock stories embedded within the forms of form
books. For that reason, the analysis of this article focuses exclusively on the forms of transactional
documents from a variety of form books. Documents used as part of actual transactions are not used as
examples in this article.
55. CHRISTINA MYERS-SHAFFER, THE PRINCIPLES OF LITERATURE: A GUIDE FOR READERS AND
WRITERS 182 (2000); see also GERALD PRINCE, A DICTIONARY OF NARRATOLOGY 92 (revised ed. 2003)
(identifying the “cruel stepmother and prince charming [as] stock characters in fairy tales”).
56. J.A. CUDDON, A DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS AND LITERARY THEORY 864–65 (4th ed.
1998). Some overlap between stock characters and archetypes exists. Archetypes represent a “basic
model from which copies are made; therefore a prototype.” CUDDON, supra note 56, at 53–54. An R
archetype is a universal character that “represents the most typical and essential characteristics.” CUD-
DON, supra note 56. The traitor, the femme fatale, and the country bumpkin are presented as archetypes R
but are also stock characters. CUDDON, supra note 56. R
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trait that is readily identifiable by the audience.57 Stock characters include
the ne’er-do-well, the wicked stepmother, the rich fop, the hermit, the brag-
gart, the coward, and the buffoon.58 Other stock characters include the
vamp, the seductress, the miser, the trickster, the prodigal son, and the min-
istering angel.59 At first consideration, these stock characters seem limited
to fictional narratives and have limited relevance, if any, to transactional
documents. Yet, these stock characters do indeed inhabit a variety of form
transactional documents, as this section showcases.
Will forms are examples of transactional form documents that are peo-
pled with a wide range of stock characters. The will is a unilateral declara-
tion as to the transfer of property upon the property owner’s death and a
designation of fiduciaries who will oversee the transfer of the property.60
The will may be the most personal of all legal documents that an individual
creates,61 and all wills are based upon one or more form documents.62 The
testator, the beneficiaries, and the fiduciaries are represented in will forms
as stock characters.
The various will forms present variations of the stock characters, with
sometimes a great variety of stock characters presented within one will
form. Consider, for example, the common will form that identifies the testa-
tor’s spouse as the sole, primary beneficiary. The two versions of the com-
mon will form gives all of the testator’s probate property outright to a
spouse63 or leaves all of the testator’s probate property in trust for a
57. JACK MYERS & MICHAEL SIMMS, THE LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF POETIC TERMS 289 (1989)
(defining a stock character as “a conventional character or stereotype whose traits have been established
by many authors”). The word stereotype is derived from Greek for “solid” and “type.” MYERS & SIMMS,
supra note 57, at 288. In narrative, a stereotype is defined as a “cliche´d characterization . . . without R
development of nuance.” MYERS & SIMMS, supra note 57. R
58. CUDDON, supra note 56, at 864–65; MYERS & SIMMS, supra note 57, at 289. R
59. For an examination of how the ministering angel stock character may undermine the weight
accorded to the professional opinion of nurses, see Mary Chiarella, Silence in Court: The Devaluation of
the Stories of Nurses in the Narratives of Health Law, 7 NURSING INQUIRY 191, 192–93, 198 (2000).
60. The Restatement (Third) of Property defines a will as:
a donative document that transfers property at death, amends, supplements, or revokes a
prior will, appoints an executor, nominates a guardian, exercises a testamentary power of
appointment, or excludes or limits the right of an individual or class to succeed to property of
the decedent passing by intestate succession. The term “will” includes a codicil. A codicil is
simply a will that amends or supplements a prior will.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DON. TRANS. § 3.1, cmt. A (1999).
61. See, e.g., Harry Hibschman, Whimsies of Will-Makers, 66 U.S. L. REV. 362, 362 (1932)
(describing wills as “human documents in which men give away themselves . . . “); see also Karen J.
Sneddon, The Will as Personal Narrative, 20 ELDER L. J. 355 (2013).
62. See generally ALISON REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACK-
GROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS, DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION (Calla-
ghan & Co. 1928); On the Origin and History of Wills, 1 LEGAL REPORTER 223 (1841).
63. For examples of this form, see 2 MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
IN GEORGIA § 17:33 (7th ed. 2008) (all to spouse with joint children as contingent beneficiaries); 6A
ERIC ZIEGENHORN, MO. PRAC., LEGAL FORMS § 20:28 (3d ed.); 10 FLA. JUR. FORMS LEGAL & BUS.
10
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spouse.64 In both versions of this common will form, the spouse is flattened
to become a stock character. In one form, giving everything to the spouse
with contingent beneficiaries being the joint children, the spouse is
presented as a ministering angel who is a deserving caregiver and will use
the testator’s property to care for their joint children.65 In the other form,
creating a trust to manage all of the property, the spouse is the stock charac-
ter of either the damsel in distress or the seductress.66 The property subject
to the trust is more than the portion needed to be held in trust to leverage
tax savings. By directing that all of the property be held in trust, the spouse
is presented as being unable to responsibly handle the property or morally
incapable of handling the property.67 These form documents, as all stock
stories do, reduce the individual into a one-dimensional stock character.
Neither of these choices reflect an option of dividing the property upon the
testator’s death among the spouse and other beneficiaries. The options are
both all to the spouse.68 While this may convey the importance of the
spouse in some families, this pattern does not convey the range of options.69
For example, a testator may wish to divide property proportionally—or
even disproportionally—between the spouse, the testator’s descendants
from a previous relationship, and the joint descendants of the spouse and
the testator. The testator may wish to divide the property between the
spouse and the testator’s parents or even between the spouse and a charita-
§ 35:126. The contingent beneficiaries are often the testator’s descendants. The testator’s descendants
are not necessarily the spouse’s descendants.
64. 2 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, TEX. LEGAL PRACTICE FORMS § 29:7 (2d ed.); 8C NICHOLS CYC. LEGAL
FORMS § 217:317 (2009).
65. Although this stock character is not exclusively female, this stock character may be considered
to be “Suzy Homemaker.” Suzy Homemaker was the name of a 1960s toy line by Topper Toy. The
series included a toy refrigerator. See Judith Gradwohl, Suzy Homemaker, a slice of life from the 1960’s,
O SAY CAN YOU SEE? STORIES FROM THE NATIONAL MUSEUM OF AMERICAN HISTORY (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://perma.cc/8PZN-ZJKW; see also GARY CROSS, KIDS’ STUFF: TOYS AND THE CHANGING WORLD
OF AMERICAN CHILDHOOD 120 (Harv. Univ. Press 1997).
66. Despite the feminized names, these stock characters are not restricted to wives. For an explora-
tion of gender bias and the QTIP trust, see Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust
and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729, 1734 (1998); Wendy C. Gerzog, Solutions
to the Sexist QTIP Provision, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 97, 97–99 (2000); Wendy C. Gerzog,
Estate of Clack: Adding Insult to Injury, or More Problems with the QTIP Tax Provisions, 6 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 221, 222 (1996); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provi-
sions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 306 (1995).
67. See, e.g., Henry M. Ordower, Trusting Our Partners: An Essay on Resetting the Estate Plan-
ning Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 313, 315–16 (1996).
68. All to the spouse in trust may not convey the trust of a spouse. For an exploration of the
dynamics of testamentary gifts to a spouse, see generally Ordower, supra note 67, at 347. R
69. See, e.g., Bobbi J. Bierhals & Kim Kamin, Planning Considerations for the Post-Nuclear Fam-
ily, 155 NO. 8 TR. & EST. 17 (Aug. 2016); see also Joan M. Burda, The Neighbors: Nontraditional
Families, Nontraditional Estates, 19 GEN. PRAC. SOLO & SMALL FIRM LAW. 22, 26 (July/Aug. 2002)
(“Many actions taken for granted by traditional families are potential sources of problems for nontradi-
tional family members.”).
11
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ble organization. The spouse need not be the sole primary beneficiary de-
spite the numerous presentations of this decision in will forms.70
The spouse is often the main stock character in will forms, but other
characters, including secondary stock characters, also inhabit will forms.
For instance, other beneficiaries may be characterized as buffoons and brag-
garts who need discretionary trusts to hold their inheritance to protect them
from themselves. These comic characters, in the mold of Shakespeare’s Fal-
staff,71 provoke laughter, not inspire confidence. The fiduciary, whether ex-
ecutor or trustee, is portrayed as the wise sage or faithful servant who un-
dertakes the overseeing and protecting of the testator’s property. This char-
acter values the trust bestowed and may be reluctant to rely upon the
judgment of others.
Form trust documents, whether trust declarations or trust agreements,
also rely upon stock characters to shape the form. Frequently the settlor, the
person who is creating the trust, is portrayed as the stock character of the
miser and the trust beneficiary is portrayed as the stock character of the
ne’er-do-well. One of the most popular trust forms,72 whether testamentary
or inter vivos, is the discretionary trust.73 With a discretionary trust, the
trustee has the authority to distribute all, some, or none of the trust property.
A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property created by
the settlor to give legal title to the trustee and equitable title to the benefici-
ary.74 Although the trustee may acknowledge his or her acceptance in a
trust agreement, a trust agreement is not a bilateral agreement where multi-
ple parties negotiate the terms of the trust relationship. Instead, the trust
instrument is a statement from the settlor to the trustee as to his or her intent
and goals relating to the management, distribution, and administration of
the trust property.75
70. Testamentary dispositions that are not consistent with a martial agreement or applicable state
law are subject to challenge. A decedent spouse may not unilaterally disinherit a surviving spouse. E.g.,
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2–202 (2008).
71. See, e.g., Northrop Frye, Characterization in Shakespearian Comedy, 4 SHAKESPEARE QUAR-
TERLY 271, 272–75 (1953).
72. A trust may be presented in testamentary trust provisions where the terms of the trust are recited
in the terms of a valid will. L. RUSH HUNT & LARA RAE HUNT, BALDWIN’S KY. WILLS AND TRUSTS
§ 16:1 (2016). A lifetime trust, in contrast, will be recited in a trust declaration or trust agreement.
VINCENT DI LORENZO & CLIFFORD R. ENNICO, BASIC LEGAL TRANSACTIONS § 40:42 (2010).
73. E.g., HELENE S. SHAPO, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, BOGERT: THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 228 (2016); Alan Newman, Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts:
Alive and Well Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 567, 568–69 (2005).
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2002) (Definition of Trust). For an examination of the
legal fiction of title-splitting, see Kent D. Schenkel, Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trusts, 45 AKRON L.
REV. 63, 81–82 (2012); Kent D. Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78
UMKC L. REV. 181, 183–85 (2009).
75. For examination of the settlor’s intent, see Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent,
the Uniform Trust Code, and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1171–74
12
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A discretionary trust bestows upon the trustee the discretion, often “the
absolute” discretion, to make distributions to and among the trust benefi-
ciaries. As observed in a recent estate planning trade magazine, “[i]n the
context of modern trust planning,” the age that trust beneficiaries receive
trust property, the proportion of trust property received by a beneficiary, or
the age when the trust beneficiary receives a formal role in the management
of trust property is a critical client decision.76 The discretionary trust form
establishes a lengthy trust duration, restricts distributions of trust property,
and does not permit the trust beneficiary to become involved in the manage-
ment of the trust property, such as becoming an investment advisor, trustee,
or trust proctor.77
The discretionary power of distributions provided in form trust docu-
ments includes the trustee’s decision to make no distribution. Trustees are
typically cautious with authorizing distributions because unforeseen, future
events may prove earlier distributions to have been unwise.78 The coupling
of discretionary power and natural reluctance of trustees to authorize distri-
butions results in the beneficiaries of many discretionary trusts receiving
little, if any, trust property.79 The creator of the trust has thereby promoted
the hoarding of property rather than the distribution and use of the property.
The beneficiary of the trust, with equitable title and yet limited—if any—
ability to compel a distribution from a discretionary trust, is thus presented
as unable to handle the responsibility of property. The spendthrift trust80 is
one extreme use of the miser and ne’er-do-well as stock characters.81
(2008); Fred Franke & Anna Katherine Moody, The Terms of the Trust: Extrinsic Evidence of Settlor
Intent, 40 AM. C. TR. EST. COUNS. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2014); Alan Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under
the Uniform Trust Code: Whose Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 651–54 (2005);
Benjamin D. Patterson, The Uniform Trust Code Revives the Historical Purposes of Trusts and Reiter-
ates the Importance of the Settlor’s Intent, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 905, 905–07 (2010).
76. Stanley H. Teitelbaum & Martin M. Shenkman, Psychological Issues of Bequests, 155 TR. &
EST. 13, 14–15 (2016).
77. Even though the revisions to the tax code have altered the value of trusts solely for tax pur-
poses, trusts continue to be a popular mechanism to ensure property management and asset protection.
See generally Jay A. Soled & Mitchell M. Gans, Asset Preservation and the Evolving Role of Trusts in
the Twenty-First Century, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2015).
78. See, e.g., Ronald R. Volkmer, Standard for Finding Abuse of Trustee’s Discretion, 41 EST.
PLAN. 42, 42–43 (Mar. 2014); see also Eric A. Manterfield, Lurking Liability for Trustees—And Their
Counsel Too, 41 EST. PLAN. 3, 6 (Oct. 2014) (“Which individual or which corporate fiduciary will
actually carry out the terms of the estate plan can have immense implications for the trust and its
beneficiaries.”).
79. See generally Shyla R. Buckner & Michelle Rosenblatt, A Rose by Any Other Name: Utilizing
and Drafting Powers for Trustees, Trustee Advisors, and Trust Protectors, 8 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP.
L.J. 41, 44, 101 (2015).
80. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 (16) (2016) (defining the spendthrift provision).
81. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 (2003). For an examination of the rise
and implications of spendthrift trust, see Mary Louise Fellows, Spendthrift Trusts: Roots and Relevance
for Twenty-First Century Planning, 50 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 140 (1995); J. Paul Fidler, Spendthrift
Provisions: Wouldn’t You Like to Be a Spendthrift Too?, 23 OHIO PROB. L.J. 9 (2012); Adam J. Hirsch,
13
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Stock characters also permeate contract form documents. One example
is the force majeure clause, a standard contract clause found in a variety of
form contracts, such as sales agreements, real estate transactions, acquisi-
tion agreements, and employment contracts, as well as in standalone boiler-
plate form provisions.82 A force majeure clause (French for “superior
force”) allows a contracting party to suspend or terminate its performance
obligations when certain circumstances arise that make performance com-
mercially impracticable or impossible.83 Virtually all of these forms de-
scribe the circumstances giving rise to the party’s ability to rely on the force
majeure clause to escape its contractual obligations as ones “beyond its rea-
sonable control.”84 These forms provide illustrative examples of the types
of circumstances considered beyond the parties’ control, generally includ-
ing “acts of God, war, terrorism, criminal acts of third parties, embargo,
strikes or other labour disputes.”85 Other standard force majeure forms de-
lineate “earthquakes; fires; . . . epidemics; . . . computer (hardware or
software) or communications service; accidents”86 as other examples of cir-
cumstances beyond the parties’ control. Thus, the contracting party resem-
bles the stock character of the innocent bystander, one who is in the wrong
place at the wrong time through no fault of his own. Alternatively, the con-
tracting party resembles the inge´nue, an endearingly innocent and whole-
some character (usually female) who is often naı¨ve and dependent, necessi-
tating the need to rely on others.
In the instance of the force majeure clause, recognition of these stock
characters may serve to best understand the purpose behind the clause—that
is, to protect an “innocent” contracting party from having to perform, or
risk being in breach and subject to damages, only when the reasons for its
failure to perform are in fact not its fault. Some form clauses even take this
idea one step further by requiring the party asserting the force majeure
clause to provide “clear and convincing evidence” of the existence of those
circumstances rendering performing impractical or impossible, or requiring
the party to use its best efforts to “remove such disability” if possible.87
Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2–3
(1995); Kellsie J. Nienhuser, Developing Trust in the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust, 15 WYO. L. REV.
551, 552–53 (2015); Soled & Gans, supra note 77, at 287–89. R
82. 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed. 2016); see also Peter Siviglia, Force Majeure,
68 N.Y. ST. B. J. 52, 52 (1996).
83. See 12. Limitation of Liability, b. Force Majeure, BLOOMBERG LAW (database updated Novem-
ber 2016).
84. See 12. Limitation of Liability, b. Force Majeure, Article 10. Miscellaneous, 10.1 Force
Majeure, Bloomberg Law (database updated November 2016); 13. General Provisions, 13.2 Force
Majeure, BLOOMBERG LAW (database updated November 2016).
85. 13. General Provisions, 13.2 Force Majeure, supra note 84. R
86. 12. Limitation of Liability, b. Force Majeure, supra note 83. R
87. Article 10. Miscellaneous, 10.1 Force Majeure, supra note 84. R
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 78 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol78/iss2/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-2\MON205.txt unknown Seq: 15  6-SEP-17 10:10
2017 TALES FROM A FORM BOOK 251
Focus on stock characters, however, may instead lead to misinterpreta-
tion of the actual parties involved. As Mieke Bal wrote, “[c]haracters re-
semble people.”88 Although there may be much resemblance between char-
acters and actual parties to a transaction, characters “are fabricated creatures
made up from fantasy, imitation, memory: paper people, without flesh and
blood.”89 Identification of actual parties as stock characters can result in
failure of recognizing the goals, needs, and intent of the parties. Consider
the example of the discretionary trust. Extrinsic evidence, meaning facts
and circumstances not referenced in the written trust instrument, may tell a
different story. For example, the settlor and beneficiary may have a close,
supportive relationship. The settlor may have selected the form due to tax-
related provisions also included in the form, never understanding that broad
discretionary powers may not be exercised freely by the trustee.90 The lan-
guage within the trust instrument which focuses solely on the settlor and
beneficiary, with little if any recognition of the actual parties carrying those
labels, will triumph over any extrinsic evidence that the settlor would ap-
prove of distributions. In other words, the settlor is a covetous miser and the
beneficiary is the irresponsible ne’er-do-well. The trustee’s actions are thus
influenced by those characters and the actions attributed to those characters.
This misinterpretation of the parties can also occur with the form force
majeure clause. While in most instances, the party seeking to enforce the
clause did not cause or have any control over the circumstances that now
make its performance impracticable or impossible (thus mirroring the em-
bedded stock characters of the innocent bystander or inge´nue), that may not
always be the case. Instead, it is possible, for example, that the actions of a
contracting manufacturer may have led, in whole or in part, to the labor
disputes that now make it impossible or commercially impracticable to per-
form. Alternatively, the contracting party may be an oil company or pollut-
ing factory that has greatly contributed to the types of “extreme weather”
identified in the form force majeure clause, or it may be a governmental
entity not taking aggressive measures to mitigate climate change.91 Did the
contracting parties intend that the force majeure clause apply under those
88. MIEKE BAL, NARRATOLOGY: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF NARRATIVE 113 (3d ed. 2009).
89. BAL, supra note 88, at 113. R
90. The benefits to creating a trust, whether during one’s lifetime or in one’s will, is not limited to
maximizing tax benefits. For example, the use of trusts allows for property management, sharing of
enjoyment of the property, and creditor protection. E.g., Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Martin M.
Shenkman, Planning in a Time of Uncertainty: Part II, 156 TR. & EST. 31, 34–35 (Feb. 2017) (reciting
the benefits to trust planning beyond tax incentives); Howard M. Zaritsky, Top Ten 2016 Tax Develop-
ments for Estate Planners, 29 NO. 1 PROBATE PRACTICE REPORTER 1, 8 Jan (2017) (identifying the
number one tax development as the potential repeal of the estate tax and reciting the non-tax benefits to
trusts).
91. See Myanna Dellinger, An “Act of God”? Rethinking Contractual Impracticability in an Era of
Anthropogenic Climate Change, 67 HASTINGS L. J. 1551 (2016).
15
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circumstances, where the party may not actually be wholly “innocent”? The
recognition of embedded stock characters in those instances may lead to a
misinterpretation of the actual parties involved and may misalign contract
interpretation from the parties’ actual intent.
The stock characters participate in the series of events, the stock plots,
as discussed in the next section.
B. Plots
A stock plot is “a standard conflict or predicament that is easily recog-
nized by an audience.”92 The stock plots progress in a familiar manner to
audiences that track the “typical” story. A widely-recognized stock plot is
boy meets girl, boy loses girl through a misunderstanding, and boy reunites
with girl.93 Other examples of stock plots include “the journey of the prodi-
gal son,” “rags-to-riches,” “the exchange of identities,” and “the seductive
vamp beguiling the innocent.”94 Employment contracts, premarital agree-
ments, and even private foundations draw from the catalogue of stock plots.
A typical employment form contract95 embodies a stock plot that is
similar to the stock plot used in the story of David and Goliath. The widely-
recognized biblical story of David and Goliath conveys the predicament of
the underdog who needs to overcome great obstacles to secure a victory that
is against all odds. It involves the triumph of the young Israelite shepherd,
David, armed only with his slingshot and some stones, against the armored
nine-foot-nine warrior, Goliath. This David and Goliath stock plot is em-
bedded within many employment form documents. When one hears the
phrase “David and Goliath,” what immediately comes to mind is an unfair
match, or, in the terms of contract transactions, unequal bargaining power
between the parties. While the reader may be rooting for the underdog
David in this story, in terms of an employment contract, once the language
is drafted in favor of the more powerful Goliath, or employer, it becomes
incredibly difficult for the underdog employee to overcome that unequal
bargaining power.
92. MYERS & SIMMS, supra note 57, at 289–90. R
93. For an examination of various stock plots in movies, see 2 BEYOND THE STARS: PLOT CONVEN-
TIONS IN AMERICAN POPULAR FILM (Paul Loukides & Linda K. Fuller eds., 1991).
94. MYERS & SIMMS, supra note 57, at 289–90; see also L. MONIQUE PITTMAN, AUTHORIZING R
SHAKESPEARE ON FILM AND TELEVISION: GENDER, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN ADAPTATION 147–48
(2011) (observing that the Shakespeare’s Romantic Comedies rely upon the stock plot of “‘boy meets
girl, boy loses girl, and boy gets girl’” (citation omitted)).
95. E.g., Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Employment as Transaction, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 447,
451 (2009).
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This unequal bargaining power can be evidenced within many differ-
ent standard employment contract form documents. For example, a typical
form termination clause provides:
Employer shall continue to employ employee for such time as employer is in
need of, or desirous of, the services of employee. It is agreed between em-
ployer and employee that the duration of employment is unspecified and
solely rests in the discretion of the employer.96
Another standard form contract clause in employment agreements is
the “right to inventions” term, under which the employer obtains exclusive
ownership of the employee’s ideas or inventions. Such form documents
often provide for employer ownership even when the invention was not
created during working hours and regardless of whether the inventions are
even within the scope of employer’s business operations or relate to any of
employer’s work or projects.97 Yet another typical clause in form employ-
ment contracts requires the employee to agree that all of her claims or dis-
putes against the employer will be decided by arbitration, while the em-
ployer makes no such reciprocal promise.98 The employer, with its greater
bargaining power and strength, is entitled to pursue any claims it may have
against the employee by jury trial, bench trial, or arbitration without any
contractual limitations. In all of these form documents, the stock story of
David and Goliath emerges—the story of the powerless employee pitted
against the powerful employer, where any potential “victory” of the em-
ployee is unlikely as against her employer and would require her to defeat
all odds.99
A twist in the use of this particular stock plot is that the true story of
David and Goliath is quite opposite to the meaning attributed to the words
“David and Goliath,”100 just like actual employment transactions. Accord-
ing to Malcolm Gladwell, among others, the story of David and Goliath is
not one about an underdog’s unlikely victory against a mighty warrior be-
cause, for one, David was not an underdog. He was a skilled shepherd ex-
perienced in the use of the devastatingly effective weapon of a sling.101
96. 7B AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d § 99:172 (2004).
97. Id. § 99:249
98. 24A WEST’S LEGAL FORMS, EMPLOYMENT § 2.52 (2003).
99. In a similar vein, certain form employment contracts feature the stock story of the battle be-
tween Odysseus and his disloyal servants in the sense that the form contract terms were drafted with a
presumption that the employee or “servant” will be disloyal to his employer. For example, a typical form
contact term, often titled “Noncompetition and Loyalty,” contains restrictions on the employee’s ability
to have an interest in any business similar to employer’s business and is based on the premise that an
employee is likely to be “disloyal” to his employer’s interests. See 7B AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d § 99.8
(2004).
100. MALCOM GLADWELL, DAVID AND GOLIATH: UNDERDOGS, MISFITS, AND THE ART OF BATTLING
GIANTS (Little Brown 2015). The TED Talk on this topic is available at Nat’l Pub. Radio, What’s the
Real Story of David and Goliath, TED RADIO HOUR, (Nov. 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/UFP5-NZKX.
101. GLADWELL, supra note 100. R
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Secondly, Goliath was not a mighty warrior with superior armor, but a “sit-
ting duck” suffering from a medical condition of acromegaly or gigantism
with resulting poor vision and slow reflexes. Along the same lines, this
counter-story to the traditionally-relayed narrative of David and Goliath
better represents many employment transactions. The employee and em-
ployer are not always in such unequal bargaining positions; this is particu-
larly true in many executive employment transactions. Therefore, the char-
acterization of this relationship between the parties in form employment
agreements is often at odds with the mutually beneficial relationship be-
tween the actual parties. The two interpretations to the stock plot of “David
and Goliath” illustrates the potential problem with stock plots. The audi-
ences’ expectations of the characters’ relationships and the actual series of
events may differ significantly from the stock plot.
One transactional form that would seem to progress along a commonly
accepted stock plot is the premarital agreement. Variations of the “boy-
meets-girl” plot underlie many form premarital agreements. Yet likewise,
the stock plots may be twisted slightly from audience expectations. A pre-
marital agreement is a bilateral agreement between two parties in advance
of marriage whereby the parties outline the rights and responsibilities with
respect to property before, during, and after the marriage.102 The focus of
form premarital agreements is not the creation of the marriage or structuring
the life of the marriage.103 The focus of most form premarital agreements is
the termination of the marriage—whether upon dissolution proceeding or
death.104 The focus upon termination influences the sequence of events in
the form to influence the progression and sequence of events in the plot.
The termination of the marriage runs counter to the “happily ever after” that
most audiences will project onto the “boy-meets-girl” stock plot.
The climax of the “boy-meets-girl” stock plot occurs when the rela-
tionship is jeopardized. The falling action and resolution centers on the
“rescue” of the relationship. Yet, the “rescue” of the premarital agreement
is not the re-affirming of the relationship and the unification of the parties.
The “rescue” of the premarital agreement is the saving of one party and the
102. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 2(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012); see also
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, 46 FAM. L.Q. 345 (2012).
103. Some scholars are urging a re-characterizing of premarital agreements to foster harmony and
stability during the relationship. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Carter, Rethinking Premarital Agreements: A
Collaborative Approach, 46 N.M. L. REV. 355, 355 (2016) (asserting that allowing couples to “arrange
their financial affairs would have an overall positive effect on relationship stability and equality of
money management within the relationship”).
104. E.g., Alison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 887, 894–96 (1997); Peter M. Walzers & Jennifer M. Riemer, Premarital Agreements for Se-
niors, 50 FAM. L.Q. 95 (2016); Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent
Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
733, 766–67 (2009).
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damnation of the other party. Two variations of the rescue exist. In one
variation of the plot line, one party is the seductive vamp, or temptress, who
has beguiled the innocent into marriage for the vamp’s own financial bene-
fit. The stock plot centers on saving the innocent from the catastrophe of his
or her folly, i.e., the marriage, by preserving the separation of assets upon
the termination of the relationship. This plot can be identified in the com-
mon form premarital agreement that presents a total waiver of rights upon
the termination of the marriage.105 Consider the following example:
The parties contemplate marriage and desire to fix their respective rights and
entitlements regarding each other’s property.
Each party waives the right to:
1. Share in each other’s estate on death, whether by will, dower,
curtesy, statutory share, statutory right, whether such right now ex-
ists by statute or case law.
2. To sharing in any pension, profit sharing, government or military
pension plan.
3. To the sharing in the increase in marital assets regarding separate
property during marriage.
4. To spousal support, whether permanent or rehabilitative, separate
maintenance, or in any other form, or division of property due to
their status of marriage or former marriage.106
Thus, the provisions of the form where both spouses waive all interests
progress along the plot line by protecting the spouse, or rather the other
family members of the spouse, from the disastrous folly that was the union.
The other spouse will receive limited financial benefit upon the termination
of the marriage, whether that termination is by death or dissolution proceed-
ing. In other words, the wealth of the spouses, or the lack thereof, remains
relatively unchanged. The wealthier spouse is therefore “saved” from his or
her folly in partnering with the less-wealthy spouse.
Another variation of the plot line, which even more explicitly seeks to
protect the innocent spouse from the femme fatale, provides punishments
for a misbehaving spouse. In that form, punishments for the spouse who
pursues dissolution proceedings or the spouse who is found to be unfaithful
during the marriage exist in the form of forfeiture, or reduction, of spousal
support or the release of interests in certain marital assets.107 The plot cen-
ters on the rescue of the boy from the girl, a twist on the romantic version of
the plot “boy meets girl.”
105. E.g., 26 IND. PRAC., ANDERSON’S WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATE PLANNING § 8:26 (2016–2017 ed.);
15 TEXAS FORMS LEGAL & BUS. § 32:14; 2 FREDERICK K. HOOPS, FREDERICK H. HOOPS III & DANIEL S.
HOOPS, FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE Appendix 21 (4th ed. 2014).
106. 4 MICH. LEGAL FORMS § 11:10; see also 4 ARIZ. PRAC., CMTY. PROP. LAW § 2.11 (3d ed.).
107. Some jurisdictions will not enforce such a provision. E.g., Diosdado v. Diosdado, 97 Cal. App.
4th 470, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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Employment contracts and premarital agreements may seem like easy
form documents to harbor stock plots. Yet, a great variety of transactional
forms rely upon a stock plot structure. For instance, the rags-to-riches stock
plot, or perhaps more universally known as “poor-boy-makes-good,”108 un-
derscores the form documents relating to charitable giving, including the
creation of a private foundation. A private foundation is a charitable organi-
zation that is not publically supported109 and may be created as a trust110 or
a corporation.111 A wealthy individual or family member creates the private
foundation to provide grants for charitable purposes or other charitable or-
ganizations.112 For example, private foundations have been created by Bill
Gates and often bear the name of the wealthy individual or family who
created the foundation.113 Beneficial tax treatment is part of the reason why
high net worth individuals may create private foundations. But the overrid-
ing reason, whether motivated by personal reflection or societal pressure, is
to “give back” and epitomizes “the responsibilities of wealth.”114 For exam-
ple, the mythology surrounding Andrew Carnegie exemplifies the “rags to
riches” stock story.115 In Carnegie’s Gospel of Wealth, he contributes to the
108. Orrin E. Klapp, The Folk Hero, 62 NO. 243 J. AMER. FOLKLORE 19, 24 (Jan.–March 1949)
(observing that the “‘poor boy makes good’ is ‘part of the biographies of successful men’”). The works
of Horatio Alger rely upon this stock plot. E.g., M.H. ABRAMS & GEOFF GALT HARPHAM, A GLOSSARY
OF LITERARY TERMS 379 (10th ed. 2012). For an example of Alger’s work and use of the stock plot, see
HORATIO ALGER, JR., RAGGED DICK OR, STREET LIFE IN NEW YORK WITH BOOT BLACKS (The John
Winston Co.: Philadelphia 1896).
109. 26 U.S.C.A. § 508 (West 2006). For an exploration of the rules applicable to charitable organi-
zations, see Philip T. Hackney, Charitable Organization Oversight: Rules v. Standards, 13 PITT. TAX
REV. 83 (2015).
110. E.g., 10 ILL. FORMS LEGAL & BUS. § 33:199; MYRON KOVE, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, &
GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TR. § 1231.
111. E.g., 11 OHIO FORMS LEGAL & BUS. § 31:47 (2016 ed.); see also Stephanie B. Casteel, My
Way: What Is the Donor’s Best Charitable Game?, SX025 ALI-CLE COURSE MATERIALS J. 875 (2016)
(highlighting options in structuring private foundations).
112. Trevor Findley, Comment, Tax Treatment of Private Charitable Foundations: A Call to Sim-
plify the Excise Tax, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 477, 478–80 (2013); see also Evelyn Brody, Charitable
Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 923 (1997) (“Private founda-
tions attract so much attention because they typically consist of a fund of investment assets, were ini-
tially funded by a single donor, are managed by that donor or his or her family or close associates, and
exist commonly to make grants to other charities rather than to conduct charitable activities directly.”).
113. See, e.g., William A. Drennan, Surnamed Charitable Trusts: Immortality at Taxpayer Expense,
61 ALA. L. REV. 225, 236, 264, 266 (2010).
114. See generally Carl J. Schramm, Law Outside the Market: The Social Utility of the Private
Foundation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 355, 376–77 (2006). See also Rene Bekkers & Pamela Wiepk-
ing, A Literature Review of Empirical Studies in Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms that Drive Charitable
Giving, 40 NO. 5 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR QUARTERLY 924, 927 (2011).
115. A recent biography of Andrew Carnegie references the “rags-to-riches” stock story with the
following beginning: “In 1848, Andrew Carnegie was an impoverished and barely educated thirteen-
year-old Scottish immigrant, whose first American job was bobbin boy in the Anchor Cotton Mill in
Allegheny City, Pennsylvania.”
SAMUEL BOSTAPH, ANDREW CARNEGIE: AN ECONOMIC BIOGRAPHY xi (2015).
20
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perpetuation of this stock story by extolling that “he who dies rich, dies
disgraced.”116 Carnegie’s meteoric “rise from a poverty-stricken Scottish
youth to an international industrial leader, philanthropist, and peace advo-
cate”117 presents a favorable narrative and glosses over the negative actions
relating to his business policies that contributed to his accumulation of
wealth. Similarly, the presence of the stock plot embedded within the form
private foundation document glosses over the potentially negative conse-
quences to the creation of a private foundation rather than an outright chari-
table gift. The form private foundation document118 progresses along the
stock plot that focuses on the generosity of the individual who shares the
fruits of his or her labor with the community.119 The rosy stock plot may
encourage a rosy interpretation of the donor’s actions and the subsequent
actions taken by parties associated with the private foundation. After all, the
donor, and by extension the private foundation, is sharing the good fortune
accrued by the donor.
The stock plot is a pattern of events that are set against the stock situa-
tions, as discussed in the next section.
C. Situations
Stock situations “are recurrent types of incidents or sequences of ac-
tions in a drama or narrative. Instances range from single situations to
events.”120 Stock situations become the stock scenes that structure the stock
plot.121 Because the audience recognizes the stock situation and its role in
the stock story, the stock situation need not be developed or presented in
full detail, but the stock situation will be vital to the progression of events in
the stock plot.122 For instance, the lurking eavesdropper, who hears only a
snippet of conversation, misconstrues the conversation, and then causes
mischief, is an example of a stock situation relevant to the progression of
116. ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 43 (The Century
Co.: New York 1901).
117. BOSTAPH, supra note 115, at ix.
118. Beth D. Tractenburg, Creating a Private Foundation Offers Many Advantages, 23 EST. PLAN.
249, 250–51 (1996) (identifying the advantages to include tax benefits and sharing philanthropic goals
with family members).
119. For an exploration of some of the issues underlying private foundations, see Rob Atkinson, Tax
Favors for Philanthropy: Should Our Republic Underwrite De Tocqueville’s Democracy, 6 WM. &
MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 3–4 (2015); Allison Anna Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable Giving, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 1663, 1665–69 (2015); Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and Charity Auton-
omy: How Public Is Private Philanthropy?, 85 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 571, 573–74, 576 (2010).
120. ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 108, at 379. R
121. CUDDON, supra note 56, at 865 (defining a stock situation as a “well-tried, recurrent pattern in R
fiction or drama”).
122. MARIO KLARER, AN INTRODUCTION TO LITERARY STUDIES 190 (3d ed. 2013) (defining a scene
as “the smallest unit in the overall structure of a play”).
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the stock plot.123 The “suddenly discovered will,”124 the unknown preg-
nancy,125 mistaken identity,126 and mutiny are other examples of stock situ-
ations which are key scenes to propel forward the events in the stock plot.
These stock plots seem to be taken from a Victorian melodrama,127 but they
exist in will forms and contract forms.
Form documents use a number of stock situations. Default provisions,
especially the so-called boilerplate provisions,128 of form documents can be
considered stock situations. The boilerplate provisions, whether the perpe-
tuities saving clause in a will129 or the force majeure clause of a contract,130
represent a set scene that needs to be included in the stock story for the
events to progress. Stock situations in form documents refer to more than
the existence of the so-called standard provisions. The stock situation refers
to the reasons why such provisions become standard.
The betrayal or mutiny is a stock situation presented in a variety of
form estate planning documents. For example, many will forms include
provisions that are attempting to brace for the will contest. This includes the
no-contest clause. Consider the following example:
If any beneficiary under this will contests or attacks this will or any of its
provisions in any manner, directly or indirectly, any share or interest in my
estate given to the contesting beneficiary under this will is revoked and must
be disposed of as if the contesting beneficiary had predeceased me [if appro-
priate, add: without issue].131
123. ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 108, at 379; see also PRINCE, supra note 55, at 92 (defining a R
stock situation as a “conventional situation”).
124. ABRAMS & HARPHAM, supra note 108, at 379. The television show “Downton Abbey” crafted R
episodes using stock situations. For example, Matthew Crawley suddenly—and unexpectedly—inherits
from his deceased fiance´e’s father to save Downton Abbey. Matthew Crawley, DOWNTON ABBEY WIKI,
https://perma.cc/U3SR-R8PE (last visited Apr. 2, 2017); see also Jessica Fellowes, The World of
Downton Abbey (2011). Wills were used extensively as stock situations in Victorian novels. See gener-
ally CATHERINE O. FRANK, LAW, LITERATURE, AND THE TRANSMISSION OF CULTURE IN ENGLAND,
1837–1925, at 65–102 (2010) (exploring use of Wills in novels by Emily Bronte, Wilkie Collins,
Charles Dickens, and George Eliot).
125. PARLEY ANN BOSWELL, PREGNANCY IN LITERATURE AND FILM (2014).
126. MYERS & SIMMS, supra note 57, at 289–90. R
127. The will was a “mainstay of the Victorian novel.” Id. at 78. As one author describes the will, “It
has a cast of characters: orphans and illegitimate children, heiresses and widows, heroes and villains; it
deals with alliances and animosities; fortunes and conditions set down that alter the life-course of survi-
vors.” Id. at 78.
128. E.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, What’s Amiss?: The Lawyering Interest in “Miscellaneous” Contract
Provisions, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 151, 151–54 (2011).
129. E.g., Verner F. Chaffin, The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Georgia Wills and Trusts:
A Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 16 GA. L. REV. 235, 277–79 (1982) (exploring the value of a
perpetuities savings clause); see also David M. Becker, Tailoring Perpetuities Provisions to Avoid
Problems, ABA PROB. & PROP. 11, 13 (Mar./Apr. 1995) (exploring both the value of and common
problems with a perpetuities savings clause).
130. Thomas Black, Sales Contracts and Impracticability in a Changing World, 13 ST. MARY’S L.J.
247, 251–55 (1981) (examining the value of a force majeure provision).
131. EDITH C. SCHAFFER, 1 CAL. TRANSACTIONS FORMS–ESTATE PLANNING § 6:116 (2016).
22
Montana Law Review, Vol. 78 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol78/iss2/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-2\MON205.txt unknown Seq: 23  6-SEP-17 10:10
2017 TALES FROM A FORM BOOK 259
The beneficiary who is objecting to the probate of the will or objecting to a
provision of the will is presented as betraying the testator. The imagery of
weapons drawn is even more developed in the following no-contest provi-
sion for a form declaration of trust:
If any beneficiary under this Declaration of Trust, either alone or with other
persons or entities, shall in any manner directly or indirectly contest, attack,
thwart, or otherwise seek to impair or invalidate any part or provision of the
“Settlor’s Estate Plan,” then any share or interest under this trust instrument
set aside for that beneficiary is revoked and shall be disposed of in the same
manner as if the contesting beneficiary, as provided in this instrument, had
predeceased the Settlor [if applicable, add: without issue].132
The form then itemizes ten actions that would constitute a “contest,” “at-
tack,” “thwart,” or “impair[ment]” of the estate plan.133 Beneficiaries band-
ing together to betray the testator’s written wishes, and thus forming a mu-
tiny, is represented in the following form no-contest clause:
If any beneficiary shall contest the probate or validity of this will or any
provision thereof, or shall institute or join in (except as a party defendant) any
proceeding to contest the validity of this will or to prevent any provision
thereof from being carried out in accordance with its terms (regardless of
whether such proceedings are instituted in good faith and with probable
cause), then all benefits provided for such beneficiary (“the contesting benefi-
ciary”) are revoked and such benefits shall pass to the residuary beneficiaries
of this will other than “the contesting beneficiary” in the proportion that the
share of each such residuary beneficiary bears to the aggregate of the effec-
tive shares of the residuary.134
The party who did not institute the objection but nevertheless became part
of the objection, is thus joining the mutiny.
The inclusion of an exculpatory clause in will forms and trust agree-
ments also represents the inclusion of the betrayal stock situation.135 The
exculpatory clause, also called an exoneration clause, exonerates a trustee
from some breaches of the trustee’s fiduciary obligation.136 A typical exon-
eration clause reads as follows:
None of my executors or trustees shall be liable to the estate or any benefici-
ary thereof for any act or omission to act in connection with the execution of
132. JOHN A. DUNCAN, 1 CAL. TRANSACTIONS FORMS–ESTATE PLANNING § 2:55 (2016) (emphasis
added).
133. DUNCAN, supra note 132. This list includes the traditional grounds for a will contest, an action R
in quantum meruit, and objection to the appointment of a fiduciary.
134. MARTIN W. O’TOOLE, ET AL., HARRIS 6TH N.Y. ESTATES: ESTATE PLANNING & TAXATION
§ 2:17 (6th ed.).
135. Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94
GEO. L.J. 67, 71–75, 85, 94–99 (2005).
136. See generally Alan Newman, Trust Law in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges to Fiduciary
Accountability, 29 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 261, 262–67 (2016).
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any of the powers or trusts hereunder except for actual fraud, wilful default,
or gross negligence.137
Another exoneration clause reads as follows:
My [individual] fiduciaries shall not be liable for any error of judgment or
mistake or for any action taken or omitted, either by them or by any agent or
attorney employed by them, or for any loss to or depreciation in the value of
my estate or any trust, except in the case of willful misconduct. Any [individ-
ual] successor fiduciary is relieved of any duty to examine the transactions of
any prior fiduciary. Any [individual] successor fiduciary shall be responsible
only for those assets which are actually delivered to such fiduciary.138
Exculpatory provisions thus presuppose that the trustee, who has been
placed in a position of trust, will participate in minor misdeeds that betray
the trust provisions and the trustee’s fiduciary obligation.139 The Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts140 and Uniform Trust Code141 expressly validates
such clauses. The inclusion of the exculpatory provisions may thereby con-
tribute to an over-confident trustee who is less careful with the administra-
tive details of record keeping and emboldened with the power to make risk-
ier investments. The documents anticipate and brace for the betrayal,
whether minor or major, of those closest to the testator. Yet, by anticipating
such a stock situation, the document may unintentionally prime the audi-
ence. Priming refers to the use of a word, phrase, or action that will provoke
an automatic response to a later use of that same word, phrase, or action.142
By including the exculpatory clause, the audience may be anticipating mi-
nor misdeeds by the trustee and become less focused on monitoring the
administration of the trust and the actions of the trustee. In fact, the pres-
ence of the exculpatory clause may mean that a subsequent issue of mis-
137. ROBERT W. KEATS, 4A KY. PRAC. METHODS OF PRAC. § 25:58 (2016).
138. RALPH H. FOLSOM, DRAFTING WILLS IN CONN. § 15:5 (2d ed.).
139. Louise Lark Hill, Fiduciary Duties and Exculpatory Clauses: Clash of the Titans or Cozy
Bedfellows?, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 829, 831–34 (2012).
140. Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides as follows:
(1) A provision in the terms of a trust that relieves a trustee of liability for breach of trust, and
that was not included in the instrument as a result of the trustee’s abuse of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship, is enforceable except to the extent that it purports to relieve the
trustee
(a) of liability for a breach of trust committed in bad faith or with indifference to the
fiduciary duties of the trustee, the terms or purposes of the trust, or the interests of the
beneficiaries, or
(b) of accountability for profits derived from a breach of trust.
(2) A no-contest clause shall not be enforced to the extent that doing so would interfere with
the enforcement or proper administration of the trust.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 (2009).
141. THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 1008 (b) (2010) provides as follows: “An exculpatory term
drafted or caused to be drafted by the trustee is invalid as an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship unless the trustee proves that the exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances and that its
existence and contents were adequately communicated to the settlor.”
142. See generally NOBUAKI HSU & ZACHARIAS SCHUTT, PSYCHOLOGY OF PRIMING (2012).
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management does not elicit ire but is accepted as an anticipated occurrence.
In contrast, the inclusion of a will contest clause may actually trigger the
filing of a will contest. Beneficiaries and heirs see the provision and then
respond with “there’s no smoke without fire.” The inclusion of the clause
does not then prevent a will contest but actually inspires one.
Similarly, the standard default damages provisions in form contracts
represent the recurring sequence of events that structure the stock plot of
the transaction. The inevitable ending of a contract form may focus on the
unavoidable “war” with contracting parties as enemies at termination. For
example, Linda Alvarez characterized the typical contract as follows: “The
contract is used in a duel to the death over competing interpretations and
counter-accusations of breach.”143
The stock situation of the war can be seen represented in virtually
every form document through the standard clauses dealing with the admin-
istration of that war, which is necessary for the parties’ progression towards
that final battle scene.144 For example, a typical form clause in a real estate
transaction often allows the parties to seek equitable damages, either instead
of or in addition to monetary damages:
The Purchaser agrees that this contract does authorize the Seller to enforce the
remedy of specific performance. The Seller agrees that this contract does au-
thorize the Purchaser to enforce the remedy of specific performance.145
A liquidated damages provision in a typical form contract for services
may state:
For each and every day work contemplated in this contract remains uncom-
pleted beyond the time set for its completion, Contractor shall pay to the
owner the sum of $____, as liquidated damages and not as a penalty. This
sum may be deducted from money due or to become due to Contractor as
compensation under this Contract.146
This clause can be seen not only as a way the victor of the battle can be
rewarded monetarily, but also as a means of providing funding for the battle
itself.
Additionally, a standard contract termination clause in a form contract
often permits one contracting party to prematurely end the relationship be-
tween the parties. In the following example, the government is the con-
tracting party that may prematurely end the relationship:
49.402–1 The Government’s right.
143. ALVAREZ, supra note 9, at 6. R
144. E.g., id. at 4 (“The contract document is considered the expression of the parties’ relationship,
comprising hard-fought deal points and whatever weapons and shelters the lawyers have managed to
embed in the boilerplate (those murky paragraphs usually disregarded by the parties and left to the
lawyers to parse and haggle over).”).
145. Scott J. Burnham, How to Read A Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 133, 165–66 (2003).
146. Burnham, supra note 145, at 166. R
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Under contracts containing the Default clause at 52.249–8, the Government
has the right, subject to the notice requirements of the clause, to terminate the
contract completely or partially for default if the contractor fails to—
(a) Make delivery of the supplies or perform the services within the
time specified in the contract,
(b) Perform any other provision of the contract, or
(c) Make progress and that failure endangers performance of the con-
tract.147
These form clauses, and numerous others like it, presuppose that the con-
tracting parties will end up in a dispute or war, necessitating ways of deter-
mining how the “rules of engagement” will play out, whether the parties
terminate their contractual relationship or battle it out for damages in court.
The stock situations are the set scenes that facilitate the progression of
the stock plot toward the stock outcome, as discussed in the next section.
D. Inevitable Outcomes
The stock story relies upon stock characters in stock situations to move
forward in a stock plot towards an inevitable stock outcome. The stock out-
comes, also called “inevitable outcomes,” are the consequences of the ac-
tions of the characters and the final plot point.148 In fairy tales, which rely
heavily upon stock stories, the inevitable outcome can be summed up with
the words “happily ever after.”149
The form Advance Directive of Health Care addresses the inevitable
consequence of life: death.150 The form document presents a more nuanced
outcome, however. The form Advance Directive for Health Care presents
the inevitable outcome of life as “the good death.”151 The good death refers
to the societally “acceptable” way of dying that occurs through a series of
147. Subpart 49.4—Termination for Default, ACQUISITION.GOV, https://perma.cc/3E8N-4W7G.
148. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE Law 95 (2000) (positing that a
“successful storyteller” presents an “ending [that] seems inevitable”).
149. For an examination of the similarities and distinctions among myths, folktales, and fairy tales,
see BRUNO BETTELHEIM, THE USES OF ENCHANTMENT: THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF FAIRY TALES
25 (1976). For an examination of the power of fairy tales, see JACK ZIPES, THE IRRESISTIBLE FAIRY
TALE: THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF A GENRE (2012); JACK ZIPES, WHY FAIRY TALES STICK:
THE EVOLUTION AND RELEVANCE OF THE GENRE (2006).
150. See, e.g., FREDERICK PARKES WEBER, ASPECTS OF DEATH AND CORRELATED ASPECTS OF LIFE
IN ART, EPIGRAM, AND POETRY 1 (Paul B. Hoeber ed., 3d ed. 1918) (“One might, indeed, define
[c]ivilized man as the animal who knows that animals must die; for man (i.e., [c]ivilized man) is proba-
bly (almost certainly) the only animal who does know it.”); see also THOMAS S. LANGNER, CHOICES FOR
LIVING: COPING WITH FEAR OF DYING 4 (2002) (observing that although animals other than humans may
experience fear when sensing a predator, animals do not appear to contemplate death).
151. For an examination of the myth of “death with dignity” and the advance directives, see Rebecca
Dresser, Shiavo and Contemporary Myths About Dying, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 821, 821, 845 (2007);
Steven I. Friedland, The Health Care Proxy and the Narrative of Death, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 95, 100–01,
106–08, 144 (1995–1996).
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events, rather than a single event.152 Thus, the good death requires an
awareness of the dying process and an involvement in the dying process.153
The good death is an inevitable stock outcome that is a component of many
stock plots.154
The Advance Directive for Health Care is the unilateral declaration as
to the wishes of an individual, called the declarant, about medical decisions.
The Advance Directive also designates a surrogate to carry out those decla-
rations in the event the declarant is unable to participate in the medical
decision-making process. Compared to form documents like wills,155 the
Advance Directive is a relatively new form document. The advancement in
the field of medicine has raised new points about the issues surrounding
death and dying, specifically the role of autonomy in dying;156 however, the
issue is a long-standing one.157
States have enacted statutory forms of the Advance Directive for
Health Care.158 While the form documents do have some variations, all of
the forms share a similar construction. The statutory forms include a series
of choices for the declarant, the individual who is creating the Advance
Directive, to record his or her wishes. A series of options are presented to
the declarant, including decisions relating to end-of-life.159 For example,
one form document presents the declarant with two options about the with-
drawal of life support. The declarant will initial one of two choices: the
“choice not to prolong life” or the “choice to prolong life.”160 Another form
152. E.g., PHILIPPE ARIES, THE HOUR OF OUR DEATH: THE CLASSIC HISTORY OF WESTERN ATTI-
TUDES TOWARD DEATH OVER THE LAST ONE THOUSAND YEARS (Helen Weaver trans., 1982); see also
Beverly McNamara, Charles Waddell, & Margaret Colvin, The Institutionalization of the Good Death,
39 NO. 11 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1501, 1501–02 (Dec. 1994).
153. McNamara, Waddell, & Colvin, supra note 152, at 1503–04; see also Werner Gruber, Note, R
Life and Death on Your Terms: The Advance Directives Dilemma and What Should Be Done in the
Wake of the Schiavo Case, 15 ELDER L.J. 503 (2007).
154. See generally Tony Walter, Historical and Cultural Variants on the Good Death, 327 BRITISH
MED. J. 218 (2003).
155. For a brief history of the will, see Barbara R. Hauser, The Tale of the Testament, 12 ABA PROB.
& PROP. 58, 59–60 (Sept./Oct. 1998).
156. For an exploration of death and dying in modern America, see ANN NEUMANN, THE GOOD
DEATH: AN EXPLORATION OF DYING IN AMERICA (2016). For the now-classic critique of dying in
America and the funeral industry, see JESSICA MITFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH (1963).
157. The Ars Moriendi refers to a collection of medieval texts detailing the “art of dying.” E.g.,
Margaret Aston, Death, FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ATTITUDES: PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIETY IN LATE MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 207 (Rosemary Horrox ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994); Karen Ingham, Tissue to Text: Ars
Moriendi and the Theatre of Anatomy, 15 NO. 1 PERFORMANCE RESEARCH: J. PERFORMING ARTS 48
(2010); see also Fritz Knaack, Shelf Life, 88 Wis. Law. 65 (Nov. 2015) (reviewing DYING IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: TOWARD A NEW ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ART OF DYING WELL).
158. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22–8A–4; WEST’S ANN. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4701; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31–32–4; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 16, § 2505; MISS. CODE ANN. § 41–41–209.
159. But see Jessica Wehrle Nester, Function Over Form: When Completing Advance Directives,
Lawyers Need a More Personal Approach, W. VA. LAW. 26, 27 (Feb. 2007).
160. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41–41–209(2)(6).
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document further breaks down the choice not to prolong life by allowing
the declarant to identify that he or she does not want: life extended by any
of the following means:
breathing machines (ventilator or respirator)
tube feeding (feeding and hydration by medical means)
antibiotics
other medications whose purpose is to extend my life
any other means.161
The form document also allows the declarant to initial the statements “I
want care that preserves my dignity and that provides comfort and relief
from symptoms that are bothering me” and “I want pain medication to be
administered to me even though this may have the unintended effect of
hastening my death.”162
In the good death, the individual “is the central actor, who ideally
maintains autonomy throughout the dying trajectory.”163 “The good death”
is thus one in which the individual has methodically expressed his or her
wishes to preserve autonomy and bodily integrity.164 By presenting these
options, the form document of the Advance Directive presents the inevita-
ble outcome of the document as “the good death.”165 And yet, the outcome
that is presented as inevitable, may not be so.
The inevitable outcome of a “good death” does not necessarily reflect
the reality of the outcome envisioned by the form. The Advance Directive,
and the treatment preferences expressed in the Advance Directive, may not
even be consulted or respected in all situations.166 First, the declarant or
agent must notify the health care provider of the existence of the Advance
161. VT. ADMIN. CODE § 12–5–15: APPENDIX A(4).
162. Id.
163. McNamara, Waddell, & Colvin, supra note 152, at 1504. R
164. See generally Kathryn Proulx & Cynthia Jacelon, Dying with Dignity: The Good Patient Versus
The Good Death, 21 NO. 2 AM. J. HOSP. PALLIT. CARE 116, 118 (Mar./Apr. 2004) (“These authors
suggest that, increasingly, hospitals and healthcare providers are urged to allow dying patients to main-
tain a sense of autonomy and control over their lives, with the freedom to choose a style of dying.”);
Bethne Hart, Peter Sainsbury & Stephanie Short, Whose Dying? A Sociological Critique of “The Good
Death”, 3 NO. 1 MORTALITY 65, 65 (1998) (noting that the concept of the good death “underpins many
of the challenges to the medical management of dying and death that have emerged through the patients’
rights movement and the right to die movement”).
165. Norman L. Cantor, Making Advance Directives Meaningful, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 629,
630 (Sept. 1998) (“By focusing on the elements of indignity that commonly concern dying persons,
drafters of advance directives can prepare forms that are relevant and meaningful to most people.”).
166. Daniel P. Hickey, The Disutility of Advance Directives: We Know the Problems, But Are There
Solutions?, 36 J. HEALTH L. 455, 457–63 (2003) (identifying the failure of medical providers to follow
the terms of the Advance Directive as a problem with the implementation of the terms of Advance
Directives); see also Sheniece Smith & Leslie Lindgren, End of Life Choices: What Does Dying with
Dignity Mean to You?, 58 ORANGE CO. LAW. 36 (Aug. 2016) (explaining that physicians can opt out of
California’s new End of Life Option Act, California Health and Safety Code § 443, which allows for the
prescription of medications to end life of the terminally ill).
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Directive.167 Second, the expressed treatment preferences on the document
may be overridden by the designated health care agent.168 Third, medical
professionals may not consult the treatment preferences or consult with the
designated health care agent in all circumstances.169 The form is designed
to accomplish a purpose that in fact will not be accomplished.
Another illustration of an inevitable stock outcome embedded within a
transactional form can be seen in form clauses and agreements relating to
incentive-based executive compensation. Often embedded in these forms is
the stock story of the Quest of the Dragon Slayer, based on the myth of
Sigurd from Nordic legends.170 According to Norse legend, Sigurd accepted
the quest of seeking the return of gold that had once belonged to Sigurd’s
father from Fafnir, who had been cursed and turned into a dragon. Sigurd’s
quest based on his loyalty to his deceased father was ultimately successful
and earned him the name of Dragon Slayer as well the reward of invulnera-
bility and, ultimately, the gift of prophecy.171 This “reward” stock outcome
is contained in a variety of employee incentive stock option and stock
purchase plan form documents. For example, a typical form recital pro-
vides:
The proper execution of the duties and responsibilities of the executives and
employees of XYZ, Inc. (the “Corporation”) and its Subsidiaries is a vital
167. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31–32–8.
168. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31–32–14(d). This is particularly true with respect to the withholding or
withdrawal of life sustaining procedures, the directions of the designated health care agent will prevail
over the written instructions expressed in the Advance Directive, unless otherwise provided by the Ad-
vance Directive. GA. CODE ANN. § 31–32–14(d).
169. E.g., Doctors Hosp. of Augusta v. Alicea, 788 S.E.2d 392, 397 (2016). In a deposition about the
doctor’s consideration of the terms of the Advance Directive and the role of the designated health care
agent, a doctor stated as follows:
If the family does not want her on the respirator, well, we can just pull the tube out. And, you
know, we’ve wasted an hour or two of her staying in the hospital ICU but, on the other hand,
if we try to make calls she’d be dead. I mean I can’t call the family. . . . I said, well, let’s just
do what’s right for the patient. My God, we can always undo it. But . . . if the patient dies, you
know, that’s my ultimate loss. There’s no way I can get her back. So when this happened I
really didn’t go into any of the code/no code/do not intubate/resuscitate. Save the patient’s life
first and then we’ll do whatever it takes to make the family and that patient whatever, but we
can’t undo death. So that’s what I was thinking.
Doctors Hosp. of Augusta, 788 S.E.2d 397 at n.3; see also Barbara A. Noah & Neal R. Feigenson,
Avoiding Overtreatment at the End of Life: Physician-Patient Communication and Truly Informed Con-
sent, 36 PACE L. REV. 736, 737–38, 742 (2016); Donna A. Casey & David M. Walker, The Clinical
Realities of Advance Directives, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 429, 433 (2011). For an examination of Doctors
Hospital of Augusta v. Alicea, see Krysta Rae Tate, Case Note, An Advance Directive: The Elective,
Effective Way to be Protective of Your Rights, 68 MERCER L. REV. 521 (2017).
170. See JESSE L. BYOCK, SAGA OF THE VOLSUNGS, (University of California Press 1990) (Iceland
n.d.); VOLSUNGA SAGA. THE SAGA OF THE VOLSUNGS. THE ICELANDIC TEXT ACCORDING TO MS NKS
1824 b, 4° (Kaaren Grimstad trans., 2nd ed., AQ-Verlag, Saarbru¨cken 2005).
171. See JESSE L. BYOCK, SAGA OF THE VOLSUNGS, (University of California Press 1990) (Iceland
n.d.); VOLSUNGA SAGA. THE SAGA OF THE VOLSUNGS. THE ICELANDIC TEXT ACCORDING TO MS NKS
1824 b, 4° (Kaaren Grimstad trans., 2nd ed., AQ-Verlag, Saarbru¨cken 2005).
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factor in the continued growth and success of the Corporation. Toward this
end, it is necessary to attract and retain effective and capable individuals to
assume positions that contribute materially to the successful operation of the
business of the Corporation and its Subsidiaries and to provide incentive com-
pensation opportunities that are competitive with other similar businesses. It
will benefit the Corporation, therefore, to bind the interests of these persons
more closely to its own interests by offering them an attractive opportunity to
acquire a proprietary interest in the Corporation . . . This stock option and
restricted stock plan is intended to serve these purposes.172
Other form documents specifically provide that the executive may acquire
additional stock options on an ongoing basis based on her continuous em-
ployment with the company, i.e. additional stock option opportunities be-
come available with each continued year of faithful service to the em-
ployer.173 Thus, the executive can be viewed as the Dragon Slayer. She is
provided with incentive (much like Sigurd) to go on a “quest” based on
loyalty, which provides her with rewards for her successful and faithful
service, much the way Sigurd earned the reward of prophecy for his suc-
cessful retrieval of the stolen treasure from the dragon.
The stock outcome is the culmination of the stock situations and the
stock plot. Also called the inevitable outcome, the stock outcome is the
ending that was always anticipated by the audience. This sets the stage for
the benefits and pitfalls of the stock stories embedded within the form docu-
ments and the audience’s perception of the stock stories.
IV. TRANSACTIONAL FORM BOOKS AS STORY BOOKS
Stock stories shape expectations and responses.174 In a similar manner,
transactional forms and form books shape expectations and responses. By
their nature, form documents are not intended to cover all possible circum-
stances of eventualities and are not intended to represent all possible trans-
actions. Indeed, the preface in form books often explicitly state that the
form documents contained within the form book are provided for reference
and inspiration.175
Form documents play a valuable and vital role in the drafting of trans-
actional documents. Recognizing form books as a compilation of stock sto-
ries allows for the better use of form books. Interpreting form documents as
172. Portfolio 239: Stock Options and Other Equity-Based Compensation Arrangements, Worksheet
1 XYZ, Inc. Stock Option and Restricted Stock Plan, Bloomberg BNA.
173. See 24A WEST’S LEGAL FORMS § 2.28 (2016).
174. Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1984).
175. E.g., GEORGE W. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF WILLS AND THE MANNER OF THEIR DRAFTING, EXE-
CUTION, PROBATE AND INTERPRETATION TOGETHER WITH TESTAMENTARY FORMS iii (2d ed. 1936) (ex-
plaining that the forms “are presented with a view of enabling the busy lawyer to obtain such hints and
suggestions as will guide him [or her] in formulating and drafting a testamentary instrument”).
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stock stories does not negate the value of form books. This section show-
cases both the possibilities and pitfalls of recognizing such embedded stock
stories to the parties, to the court, to other parties, and to society in general.
A. Possibilities
Forms, and the compilations of forms into form books, are valuable
resources to drafting attorneys, transacting parties, courts, and other third
parties.176 One author described forms books as “a boon for attorneys.”177
Another author described form documents as “the accumulated wisdom of
many.”178 Form books, as the compilation of form documents, are like story
books in that a variety of form documents are presented to the drafter. The
drafter can then evaluate a variety of form documents to select the most
appropriate base form document to use.
The widespread recognition of patterns in form transactional docu-
ments is similar to the widespread recognition of patterns of stock stories,
and this recognition becomes a narrative short cut. The stock story is readily
identifiable by the audience; the story need not be told in detail for the
audience to understand the story, whether that means the identification of
the characters, the plot, the situations, or the outcomes. Shorthand refer-
ences and allusions will be understood by the audience. In a similar manner,
form documents are narrative short cuts. The title of a form immediately
conveys to the audience the purpose of the document. For example, a docu-
ment titled “Last Will and Testament” will be interpreted by the audience to
be the testator’s will, and a form titled “Commercial Lease Agreement” will
be understood to address a lease for commercial, rather than residential,
purposes. When interpreting the provisions in the transactional document,
the parties to the transaction, third parties, and the court can—and will—
rely upon the shorthand references. The narrative short cuts not only facili-
tate the interpretation, but also reduce the time and cost needed to develop
the documents in the first place.179 The parties to the transaction and the
drafter can rely upon the form document to structure the parameters of the
transaction and supply some of the details.
176. E.g., WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACT DRAFTING 44 (2d ed., 2013)
(identifying the first step in the drafting process as “locat[ing] a form or sample contract (often called a
precedent) to use as the starting point for your contract”); TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW
AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO 335 (2007) (“Think of a precedent as a template that you tailor
for each transaction.”).
177. Tom Gaylord, Forms and Drafting Resources for Illinois Attorneys, 100 ILL. B.J. 496, 496
(2012).
178. Hill, supra note 43, at 59. R
179. E.g., DARMSTADTER, supra note 49, at 213 (“It’s comforting to pontificate that every document R
should be poured over by highly trained lawyers bent on absolute perfection. The truth, however, is that
clients often prefer Quick, Cheap, and No Surprises.”) (capitalization in original).
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The form document can also serve to guide the formation of the trans-
action and the development of the transactional documents. The form docu-
ment provides a series of prompts and reminders, encouraging the parties to
the transaction and the drafters to insert key information that otherwise may
be neglected, omitted, or forgotten.180 In terms of a form, the stock plot and
inevitable outcome anticipate contingencies and events so that the drafter
does not neglect to include a key provision. For example, an executive em-
ployment agreement form document includes terms regarding salary, bonus,
fringe benefits, and stock options, aimed towards an inevitable outcome of
“happily ever after.” On the other hand, such form documents also often
include terms relating to involuntary termination, covenants not to compete,
and non-disclosure obligations, aimed towards the inevitable outcome of a
“battle among enemies.” This is especially valuable considering that many
transactional form documents are drafted without the assistance of an attor-
ney and the forms created are replicated from transaction to transaction.
The use of forms can also promote confidence in the document cre-
ated. The existence of provisions within the form convey the value of
“time-tested” provisions.181 This can alleviate a level of uncertainty to the
parties to the transaction. The use of the form documents with their embed-
ded stock stories enables the parties to better comprehend the most likely,
inevitable course of events of this type of transaction and how they likely
end.
The recognition of the stock stories within the transactional forms is
particularly beneficial because many transactions do in fact follow the nar-
rative, or pattern, of the stock story. The stock story thus is an accurate
representation of the intended transaction. Part of the power of stock stories
is that the pattern does in fact fit so many narratives. For example, the
nonfamily caregiver may in fact be the trickster who is attempting to
deceive the testator for the caregiver’s own benefit. The contracting parties
often do end battling about the meaning of particular provisions in the con-
tract. Thus, the stock plots of the form agreement addressing attorneys’
fees, choice of forum, and choice of law governing contract disputes are
both beneficial and efficient ways to determine these relevant issues before
the battle begins.
180. E.g., Erik F. Gerding, Contract as Pattern Language, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1323 (2013).
181. The value of “time-tested” language may be overstated. See KEVIN D. MILLARD, DRAFTING
WILLS, TRUSTS AND OTHER ESTATE PLANNING DOCUMENTS: A STYLE MANUAL 16 (2006) (“Lawyers are
busy, cautious people, and they cannot afford to make mistakes. The old, redundant phrase has worked
in the past; a new one may somehow raise a question. To check it in the library will take time, and time
is the lawyer’s most precious commodity.”); see also DARMSTADTER, supra note 49, at xi (“In the R
turmoil that surrounds most transactions, lawyers are reluctant to dispense with standard phraseology no
matter how obscure. Anyone who questions a provision may be told, in all sincerity, that the provision
and its language are time- or court-tested.”).
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In sum, transactional form documents are not only widely-used but
offer many possibilities. Recognizing the stock story embedded within the
particular form document to be used results in a more nuanced use of the
form document that furthers the intent of the parties to the transaction and
prevents misinterpretation of the document produced.
B. Pitfalls
Despite the benefits afforded by the range of form documents availa-
ble, a transactional form document could be improperly used, either be-
cause the form document is not properly executed or the form document
used does not represent the anticipated transaction.182 This section explores
not the improperly used form but the pitfalls related to the recognition of
stock stories embedded within form transactional documents.
A concern with all stock stories is the compression of the narrative in a
manner that squashes, distorts, or misrepresents the individual story. The
stock story is a flat narrative which, by definition, does not represent the
uniqueness of the individual parties, the personalized scenes, the unique
sequence of events, or the particular outcome. The stock story necessarily
relies upon generic stock characters, stock situations, stock plots, and stock
outcomes. By the nature of stock stories, for example, the characters are
presented with generic characteristics rather than actual names. Continuing
use of the form conventions perpetuate the stock story. As a consequence,
continuing to use roles rather than actual names, like using the word
“spouse” in a will form rather than the name of the spouse, or using “buyer”
and “seller” in a sales contract rather than the actual names of the con-
tracting parties, facilitates the flattening of the parties into stock characters.
Supplementing the stock story or altering the stock story requires de-
liberate drafting choices. When relating stock stories to transactional form
documents, the compression may unintentionally direct the drafting of the
transactional document such that the drafter fails to fully customize the doc-
ument for the individual parties and instead relies upon standard provi-
sions.183 For example, reliance on the basic discretionary trust form
182. For an analysis of forms and form use, see Davis, supra note 46. R
183. For an exploration of the need to develop documents to reflect individuals, see Avi Z. Kesten-
baum & Amy F. Altman, Have We Got It All Wrong?: Rethinking the Fabric of Estate Planning, 155
NO. 2 TR. & EST. 29 (FEB. 2016); Thomas L. Stover, Will the Tax Tail Still Wag the Estate Planning
Dog?, 41 EST. PLAN. 3 (2014); James H. Siegel, The Importance of Analyzing Family Dynamics to
Provide Clients with Appropriate Trust and Estate Plans, ASPATORE, 2012 WL 4964459 (2012); see
also Lori D. Johnson, Say the Magic Word: A Rhetorical Analysis of Contract Drafting Choices, 65
SYRACUSE L. REV. 451 (2015); Avi Z. Kestenbaum, Jeffrey A. Galant, & K. Eli Akhaven, The State of
Estate Planning, 150 NO. 3 TR. & EST. 35, 39 (Mar. 2011) (“Instead of concentrating on particular estate
planning techniques and forcing their clients into these same techniques over and over again, estate
planners will now be compelled to focus on each individual and unique client.”).
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presents the trustee as the wise soldier who must protect the settlor’s prop-
erty from the buffoon of a beneficiary. The trustee’s decision to authorize
no trust distributions or to withhold trust distributions corresponds to the
stock characterization of the trustee and the beneficiary. Yet, the settlor may
not have intended to embolden the trustee or to minimize the beneficiary’s
financial capabilities. Thus, the drafter must pay careful attention to
whether the stock story embedded within the form actually corresponds
with the parties’ intent.
The existence of the stock story within the transactional form docu-
ment may also hinder drafting innovation. Form documents have always
been intended to function as a base for the customization and personaliza-
tion of the form.184 Instead of focusing on innovation when designing the
transactional document,185 a drafter may force a transaction into a stock
story that is ill-fitting. As one author wrote, “It is easy to make the mistake
of finding a form for a particular kind of document, such as a will, and then
using that form uncritically over and over.”186 For example, the discretion-
ary trust form that provides no direction to the trustee may work in some
situations but not others. The use of this form may limit the drafter’s ability
to consider alternate structures and additional directions or other limitations
to the discretionary authority granted to the trustee. For example, with the
form premarital agreement, a drafter may rely upon the rescue stock plot
structure despite the equal bargaining power and comparable financial net
worth of the two parties.
The mechanical replication may produce a document that is incom-
plete or even undermines the goals of the specific parties to the transac-
tion.187 Where the individual transaction does not fit precisely within a
stock story, the resulting document may be an unruly amalgamation of a
variety of form provisions that lacks a unified narrative. The provisions
within the document can create tension and ambiguity. The replication of
forms may also encourage the inclusion of “sticky provisions,” provisions
that are replicated from transaction to transaction because, in part, they cor-
184. ALVAREZ, supra note 9, at 153 (“It can be very tempting to just drop a provision from the last R
document one drafted into the next that is being created for another client. . . . Resist the urge to copy
and paste.”) (italics in original).
185. E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innovation: The
Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170,
171 (2013) (exploring contract innovation and the role that courts play in promoting and hindering
contract innovation).
186. MILLARD, supra note 181, at xiii. R
187. E.g., William A. Scott, Filling in the Blanks: How Computerized Forms Are Affecting the Legal
Profession, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 835 (2003) (exploring the pros and cons of fill-in-the-blank legal
forms for both lawyers and laypersons).
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respond to audience expectations,188 even where there is little direct benefit
to the particular transaction’s parties or relevance to the particular transac-
tion.189 For example, the form clause in a real estate transactional document
allowing parties to seek liquidated damages pits the contracting parties
against each other in a battle. Yet the need or even possibility of awarding
equitable damages may not be called for by the particular transaction.
Moreover, the recognition and identification of stock stories produces
an instant and strong response. Stock stories provoke stock responses.190 A
stock response relies upon “a standard pattern of behavior” that involves
“[n]o critical judgment.”191 The response is thus automatic, such as “cheer-
ing the hero and booing the villain.” The strong response to a stock story
means that triggering an alternate response may be difficult.192 After all, as
Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner wrote in their influential book
Minding the Law, “We are quicker to see the expected than the unex-
pected.”193 For instance, the non-wealthy spouse may be viewed with suspi-
cion when objecting to the enforceability of a premarital agreement. This
spouse may be viewed as the stock character of the trickster or the femme
fatale, the person who needs to be punished, not the person who needs to be
protected from the over-reaching of his or her partner. The trustee who fails
to authorize distributions may be assumed to be the wise sage safeguarding
property until the student, in this case the trust beneficiary, is ready—de-
spite actual financial hardship faced by the real beneficiary of the trust. The
employee in an employment agreement may be assumed to be the unfaithful
servant, in need of being restrained from acting disloyal towards his em-
ployer, instead of the faithful servant in need of protection or even reward.
The readily recognizable stock story in a form document may thus
make an attempt to project an alternate story difficult, especially if the alter-
nate story runs counter to the expected stock story.194 As narratologist
188. ALVAREZ, supra note 9, at 127 (asking drafting attorneys the following: “How often have you R
received a form contract that contains nonsensical terms, clauses containing sentences without subjects
or objects, broken fossils of ancient cut-and-paste jobs that no one noticed were incomplete?”).
189. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Adams, Dysfunction in Contract Drafting: The Causes and A Cure, 15
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 317 (2014) (observing the over-confidence that may be produced by
relying on forms or previously used documents); Larry E. Ribstein, Sticky Forms, Property Rights, and
Law, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 68 (2011) (“One reason for not changing a contract clause that has
stopped making sense is that the costs of change outweigh the benefits”); see also Robert E. Shapiro, Do
Lawyers Think about What They’re Doing?, 41 NO. 2 LITIGATION 59 (2015) (“These provisions have
now become routine, done because always done.”).
190. A “stock response” is defined as “the predictable, shallow reaction to standard and commonly
recognized characters, settings, situations, or symbols.” MYERS & SIMMS, supra note 57, at 289. R
191. CUDDON, supra note 56, at 865. R
192. Id.
193. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 1, at 47. R
194. Bret Rappaport, A Lawyer’s Hidden Persuader: Genre Bias and How It Shapes Legal Texts by
Constraining Writers’ Choices and Influencing Readers’ Perceptions, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 197 (2013).
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Mieke Bal wrote, “We tend to notice only what we already know, unless the
deviation from the expectation is strongly enhanced.”195 Because of the im-
mediate recognition of stock stories by the audience, the audience may use
the stock story to fill in gaps in the narrative. The audience may project an
intent of the parties to the transaction that is not representative of the actual
intent. The audience may react to the malicious intent of the spouse seduc-
tress in the premarital agreement or the joie de vivre of the “poor-boy-
makes-good” despite any evidence of such intent. The audience may also
interpret, or even re-interpret, events and actions in the actual story by refer-
encing a stock story.
This may occur even if the form document does not expressly contain
the stock story. For example, during will contests, contestants, those indi-
viduals who are objecting to the validity of a will, may share a story that
runs counter to the text of the written will but often corresponds with a
stock story.196 The stock character of “the wicked stepmother” is referenced
in will contests.197 This stock character is not necessarily representative of
the actual individual or the family relationship during the life of the testator.
Indeed, the source of the stock character for “the wicked stepmother,” the
Grimm Brothers, represents a deliberate revision of the characters in the
source folk tales and wonder tales from biological mothers to step-mothers
so as not to disrespect their own mother.198 Yet, the replication of the
“wicked stepmother” encourages audiences to project that stock character—
even when the step-parent is not in fact “wicked.” In a similar way, the non-
family caregiver who receives a gift under the will may be interpreted as the
stock character of the trickster,199 even without facts that would suggest the
195. BAL, supra note 88, at 122. R
196. As one scholar wrote, “Indeed, the ability to contest a will or appeal a legal case shows that the
law is regularly used to alter rather than endorse the testator’s text when its readers cannot accept a
particular ‘will story.’”
FRANK, supra note 124, at 62. R
For an overview of the mechanics of a will contest, see generally Joyce Moore, Will Contests:
From Start to Finish, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 97 (2012). For an exploration of strategies to minimize the
success of a will contest, see Margaret Ryznar & Angelique Devaux, Au Revoir, Will Contests: Compar-
ative Lessons for Preventing Will Contests, 14 NEV. L.J. 1 (2013); Dennis W. Collins, Avoiding a Will
Contest—The Impossible Dream?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 7 (2000).
197. See, e.g., Martin D. Begleiter, Grim Fairy Tales: Studies of Wicked Stepmothers, Poisoned
Apples, and the Elective Share, 78 ALB. L. REV. 521 (2014–2015). For an examination of the rights and
responsibilities of stepparents in family law and succession, see Peter M. Bryniczka, Rights, Responsi-
bilities & Liabilities of a Stepparent, 36 FAM. ADVOC. 26 (Summer 2013).
198. JACK ZIPES, WHY FAIRY TALES STICK: THE EVOLUTION AND RELEVANCE OF A GENRE 114
(2006) (sharing that the Brothers Grimm replaced biological mother villain of folk tales with the step-
mother villain of fairy tales to avoid disrespecting their own mother).
199. For an exploration of non-family caregivers and Wills, see Robert Barton, Lisa M. Lukaszew-
ski, & Stacie T. Lau, Gifts to Caretakers: Acts of Gratitude or Disguised Malfeasance? New Statutes
May Decide for Us, ABA PROB. & PROP. 22 (May/June 2015); Kirsten M. Kwasneski, Comment, The
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non-family caregiver is a trickster.200 The characteristics of the stock char-
acter are thus superimposed upon the actual individual referenced in the
transactional document. In the example of an employment agreement, the
audience may automatically project the employer as a Goliath or as an army
preparing for battle, when in reality, it may be a gracious and generous
employer attempting to protect itself, its shareholders, or its employees
from the potential harms caused by a “bad hire.” Thus, from the perspec-
tives of the transactional drafters and the parties to these agreements, this
recognition of stock stories must be accompanied by the understanding that,
at times, the stock story may need to be deliberately altered or even omitted.
Because stock stories are so readily identifiable and provoke a stock
response, a reference included in the document may miscue a judicial audi-
ence and lead to misinterpretation. For instance, reliance on stock stories
may tempt a court to interpret a transactional document by referencing the
stock story that would be presented in the form transactional document
rather than individual transactional document produced.201 A court may in-
terpret the meaning of the contract term based on the stock plot embedded
within the document. For example, the court may liberally interpret a provi-
sion relating to a stock incentive plan, in line with the stock outcome of the
just reward earned by a conquering hero on a dragon quest. This liberal
interpretation may occur contrary to the parties’ actual intent or the precise
language of their agreement.
Parties to the transactions, and even courts, may assume that certain
provisions would be included, even if the provisions have not been, because
of the existence of the stock story. For example, they may assume that a
force majeure clause will be triggered in a particular situation that is not
specifically addressed in the force majeure clause or even when such a
clause must be implied in its entirety. Similarly, a court may interpret a
transactional document by adding a provision from the form document that
is missing from the transactional document produced, or it may interpret the
provision in relation to the stock story—despite the presence of language to
the contrary in the transactional document. This could unintentionally lead
to an interpretation of the contract by a court in a manner that differs from
the parties’ actual intent at the time of contracting.
The best form document is susceptible to misuse. Ignoring the stock
story embedded within the form document selection or dismissing the stock
Danger of a Label: How the Legal Interpretation of “Care Custodian” Can Frustrate a Testator’s Wish
to Make a Gift to a Personal Friend, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 269 (2006).
200. Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
129 (2008) (asserting that the law should respect a testator’s decision to disinherit family and favor a
non-family caregiver).
201. Baron, supra note 51, at 666–67 (suggesting that individual testator’s stories “in all their rich- R
ness and detail” should be the basis for interpreting wills—rather than reliance on stock stories).
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story that may be projected by the audience is done at the peril of the trans-
acting parties. Recognizing the intended purpose of the form document and
the stock story contained within the form document facilitates the effective
use of the form document.
V. CONCLUSION
Form books do not begin with “once upon a time.” Yet the compilation
of forms, whether hard copy or digital copy, into a form book creates, in
essence, a story book. Embedded within those form documents are stock
stories that rely upon stock characters, stock plots, stock situations, and
stock inevitable outcomes to produce a stock response. Far from undermin-
ing the value of transactional form documents in form books, recognizing
form books as compilations of stock stories facilitates the effective use of
form documents. Recognizing that the individual story of a transaction will
be built upon a stock story facilitates the selection of the document form,
engagement with the document form, and ultimately produces a document
that better promotes the goals of the transactional parties. Form books are
valuable resources for parties to transactions, drafters of transactional docu-
ments, and third-party audiences of transactional documents. Accordingly,
form books should be used to facilitate the crafting of individual transac-
tional documents to produce the “happily ever after.”
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